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RENEGOTIATING TRANSNATIONAL
INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS: LESSONS
FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES FROM
THE GHANA-VALCO EXPERIENCE
Paul Kuruk*
INTRODUCTION
Foreign private investment between developing countries and
transnational corporations (TNCs)l has been the principal method
through which developing countries have obtained much needed capi-
tal contributions and technical assistance2 to effectively exploit their
rich reserves of natural resources. Significantly, in many of the early
investment agreements, the TNCs came away with extremely generous
concessions 3 due to a stronger bargaining power reflected in their su-
perior knowledge of industry-wide trends and support from their
home governments and international financial institutions.4 With the
implementation of the investments, however, as the developing coun-
tries became better informed about the industry and acquired a captive
power over physical facilities associated with the investments, these
countries have reexamined the contractual arrangements with their
foreign partners and have often called for modification of investment
agreements that did not meet their expectations. 5 Resistance by the
TNCs to such requests has invariably strained relations between the
* University of Ghana, LL.B. (1981); Temple University School of Law, LL.M. (1985);
Temple University, M.A. (1986); Stanford Law School, J.S.D. (1990). Associate, Gibson, Dunn
& Crutcher, Los Angeles.
1. See generally UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, TRENDS
AND PROBLEMS IN WORLD TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, U.N. Doc. TD/28/Supp. 1 (1967)
(study prepared by the Science Policy Research University of Sussex, U.K.).
2. U.N. CENTER FOR TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS, TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS
AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER: EFFECTS AND POLICY ISSUES, U.N. Doc. ST/CTC/86, U.N.
Sales No. E.87.II.4.A. (1986).
3. To encourage foreign participation, the host countries found it necessary to grant incen-
tives including tax relief, remittances of profit, foreign exchange exemptions, and limited export
and import duties. See generally E.I. NWOGUGU, THE LEGAL PROBLEMS OF FOREIGN INVEST-
MENT IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (1965).
4. See infra notes 195-200 and accompanying text.
5. For example, in August 1968 the Zambian government renegotiated its agreement with
the major aluminum companies in the country. See generally SIMON CUNNINGHAM, THE COP-
PER INDUSTRY IN ZAMBIA: FOREIGN MINING COMPANIES IN A DEVELOPING COUNTRY
(1981); ANTHONY MARTIN, MINDING THEIR OWN BUSINESS: ZAMBIA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST
WESTERN CONTROL (1972).
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participants and, sometimes, even prompted nationalization of the
investments. 6
This article describes the use of the renegotiation process to resolve
problems that arise in the relations between participants in transna-
tional investment. It draws conclusions from the successful renegoti-
ation of an agreement executed in 1962 under which the Ghanaian
government guaranteed bauxite and hydroelectric power supplies to
support the smelting operations of the Volta Aluminium Company,
Limited (Valco) in return for revenues from taxes and from payments
for electricity, water, and use of the country's port facilities. The
agreement between Ghana and Valco was entered into as part of the
Volta River Project (VRP). This project was an investment scheme
that involved construction of a hydroelectric dam by the Volta River
Authority (VRA), a government agency, to provide sufficient power
for the production of aluminum at a smelter. The smelter was con-
structed and owned by two American transnational companies7 -
Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical Corporation (Kaiser) and the Reyn-
olds Metals Corporation (Reynolds) - through Valco, their Ghanaian
subsidiary.8
The article briefly outlines the problems that arose in the VRP af-
ter nearly two decades of operation. The article notes that the deter-
mination to address the problems of a bad national economy -
problems believed to have been caused in part by what was seen as the
uneconomic and inequitable terms of the investment agreement -
compelled the Ghanaian government to renegotiate the agreement in
the period from 1983 to 1985. The main benefit to the country under
the revised agreement is the potential increase in revenue from the
6. For example, in 1971, then-President Allende of Chile nationalized the Chilean Telephone
Company (a subsidiary of International Telephone and Telegraph) after the company frustrated
the governmental efforts to negotiate their contract. EDWARD BOORSTEIN, ALLENDE'S CHILE:
AN INSIDE VIEW 127-31 (1977).
7. The VRP was made possible by generous contributions from international financial insti-
tutions including the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank),
the United States Export and Import Bank (Eximbank), the United Kingdom Export Credits
Guarantee Department (UKECGD), and the United States Agency for International Develop-
ment (USAID). The Ghanaian government alone received nearly $100 million in loans from
those institutions to meet the cost of dam construction, while Valco obtained a $110 million loan
from the Eximbank and an additional $32 million from its shareholders to finance the smelter
construction.
8. The terms of the Volta River Project (VRP) are contained in a complex -of agreements
signed on February 8, 1962, by the government of Ghana, Valco, and the various financiers of
the project. The main closing documents were comprised of a master agreement (defining the
rights and obligations of Ghana and Valco), various loan agreements, a guarantee agreement
between Ghana and Eximbank, and Valco agreements made with its shareholders on tolling and
on management and technical services assistance. See generally Master Agreement Between the
government of Ghana and Volta Aluminum Company (1962) [hereinafter Master Agreement]
(Composite Conformed Copy, as amended through January 30, 1985).
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project. The company also gained by securing terms that assured its
international competitiveness.
After analyzing the factors affecting the outcome of the Ghana-
Valco renegotiations and comparing the processes of the original nego-
tiations and the renegotiations, the article offers some strategies for
host countries on renegotiating transnational investment agreements.
While the article appreciates the rationale for stabilization clauses in
investment contracts, it rejects the attempts frequently made through
such provisions to preclude review by host societies, arguing that in-
vestment agreements operate in a fluid environment and are affected
by economic conditions unforeseen at the time such agreements are
originally signed. The inclusion of review provisions in transnational
investment agreements is, therefore, seen as an effective mechanism
enabling the parties to readjust the terms of the arrangement to ac-
commodate unexpected developments. The most important recom-
mendation of the article is for host societies to prepare adequately
before the renegotiations begin, and to adopt sound strategies during
renegotiations. The development of local expertise, supplemented by
use of foreign experts, will enable the host country to undercut the
TNC's superior knowledge in the relevant industry..
I. PROBLEMS WITH THE ORIGINAL GHANA-VALCO
ARRANGEMENTS
Ghana and the shareholders of Valco had different reasons for par-
ticipating in the investment scheme. Viewing the hydropower compo-
nent as the cornerstone of national economic growth, Dr. Kwame
Nkrumah, the Prime Minister of the country at the time of the origi-
nal negotiations, hoped to obtain sufficient energy from the project to
facilitate the industrialization of the country9 and to provide a strong
economic power base that could be used to promote African unity,
preserve the country's political independence, and create internal sta-
bility.10 The possible integration of the Ghanaian aluminum industry
9. The Prime Minister observed:
All industries of any major economic significance require as a basic facility, a large and
reliable source of power. In fact, the industrialization of Europe, of America, of Canada, of
Russia, and of other countries emerged as a result of the invention of sources of hitherto
undreamt of size. Newer nations such as ours, which are determined to use every possible
means to catch up in industrial strength, must have electricity in abundancg before they can
expect any large scale industrial advance. Electricity is the basis for industrialization. That
basically is the justification for the Volta River Project.
DAVID HART, THE VOLTA RIVER PROJECT: A CASE STUDY IN POLITICS AND TECHNOLOGY
40-41 (1980); see JON WORONOFF, WEST AFRICAN WAGER: HOUPHOUET VERSUS NKRUMAH
181 (1981); see also TONY KILLICK, DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS IN ACTION 45 (1978).
10. GHANA & NKRUMAH Ill (Thomas A. Howell & Jeffery P. Rajasooria eds., 1972).
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through the processing of the country's bauxite into alumina for use at
the Valco smelter was a secondary interest. I" Integration of the alumi-
num industry was expected to produce linkage effects in the economy,
greatly aiding in the country's development.' 2 Although Nkrumah
was not enthusiastic about the idea of aluminum smelting as part of
the VRP, he agreed to it because it was a necessary condition to the
external financing which he badly needed to get the hydroelectric pro-
ject started.' 3 No doubt he was convinced that he could successfully
accommodate the smelter without adversely affecting the power needs
of the Ghanaian public. '4 It is widely believed that his strategy was to
accept the agreement so that once the project took off he would be in a
position to renegotiate a better deal.15
To Kaiser and Reynolds, the VRP provided an opportunity to ob-
tain access to vast bauxite deposits and cheap hydropower in Africa to
supplement their limited reserves in the United States.' 6 Under their
agreement with the government, they were guaranteed nearly three-
quarters of the energy produced. As a most-favored customer, they
paid for this energy at the low rate of 6.265 mills per kilowatt hour
(mills/kwh) fixed for thirty years. 17 Although they also acquired min-
ing concessions extending over forty square miles, they were under no
obligation to exploit them.' 8 Incentives the government provided to
the companies included low fees for water, port, and wharfage serv-
ices, 19 a ten year tax relief,20 exemption from foreign exchange regula-
11. GHANA NATIONAL PLANNING COMMISSION SEVEN-YEAR PLAN FOR NATURAL RE-
CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT, FINANCIAL YEARS 1963/64-1969/70 (1964) (especially
pertinent are 116, 208).
12. HART, supra note 9, at 42.
13. International lending institutions were reluctant to lend money where they were not as-
sured that a reliable customer existed who would use the excess electricity left after the residen-
tial and business needs of Ghanaians were met. The involvement of aluminum companies
satisfied banks that Ghana would be able to repay their loans with revenue from the sale of power
to the smelter.
14. Imperialism and the Volta Dam, W. AFR., Mar. 24, 1980, at 518, 522.
15. Kwesi Owusu, The Valco Debate, W. AFR., Nov. 1, 1982, at 2826-27.
16. Aluminum Co. of America (Alcoa) at that time held a monopoly over those resources in
U.S. industry.
17. Master Agreement, supra note 8, art. 12.
18. Id. art. 14.
19. Valco was guaranteed a continuous supply of water for which it paid three shillings for
every 1000 gallons of water supplied. For use of port facilities, Valco paid £15,000 per year as
rent and £5,000 tQ, cover dredging costs. Provisions were also made for payment of harbor dues
at one shilling per ton and wharfage charges at one penny per ton for cargo that was loaded and
unloaded. See Water Agreement Between the Republic of Ghana and the Volta Aluminium
Company, art. 7 (1962).
20. Ghana was required to enter into a tax treaty with the United States under the terms of
which Valco shareholders would be deemed to have paid taxes in Ghana, thus qualifying for
exemption from further tax in the United States. Valco was also certified as a pioneer company,
[VIol. 13:43
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tions,21 duty-free status for the company's alumina imports and
aluminum exports, 22 and firm guarantees protecting the investment.
23
Because the construction of the hydroelectric dam and the smelter
was completed by 1967, it was possible to begin the immediate produc-
tion of aluminum.24 Since then, Ghana has continued to meet its con-
tractual obligation to supply energy to the Valco smelter, which in
turn has produced aluminum ingots for its shareholders. By 1982,
both parties appeared to have derived the benefits they expected from
their participation in the project. Valco's self-described and somewhat
understated gains consisted of $27 million in income that it applied
toward tolling charge prepayments, and $20 million in dividend in-
come that it declared in 1980.25 The country acknowledged benefits
from the hydropower supply26 and from employment opportunities
27
thereby entitling it to income tax relief under the 1959 Pioneer Industries and Companies Act.
The tax relief enabled the company to make sufficient net earnings to recover the lower of either
its total paid-up share capital, or one-half of the capital cost incurred by Valco in constructing
the smelter. When the tax became payable, there was to be a freezing of the tax rates charged for
a period of 30 years. Any tax assessed against Valco was to remain at the rates prevailing in
January 1962. Master Agreement, supra note 8, arts. 31, 32, & 40.
21. Id. art. 33.
22. Id. arts. 19-20.
23. Assurances requested by Kaiser and Reynolds for the protection of the Valco investment
came under various provisions dealing with nondiscrimination, expropriation, and indemnifica-
tion. Additionally, the Government guaranteed Valco's rights would not be affected should
Ghana enter into a confederation with other African States. To ensure Valco's influence in the
Volta River Authority (VRA) so that the latter would not arbitrarily act against the company's
interest, the governing board of the VRA was, for thirty years, to include a member nominated
by Valco. Contractual disputes were to be settled by arbitration in accordance with international
rules of arbitration. Finally, to insulate the scheme from future legislative changes, the law gov-
erning the agreement was the law of Ghana existing at the time of the execution of the agree-
ment. Master Agreement, supra note 8, arts. 9, 35, 36, 38, 41, 48, & 49.
24. GHANA & NKRUMAH, supra note 10, at 156.
25. The declared figures were misleading because the company's assessment ignores the real
value of the investment which, using the blue book value of the shareholders' equity as a guide,
had increased from $12 million to more than $136 million by the end of 1982. Louis Casely-
Hayford & Rod Sims, Renegotiating the Price and Availability of Energy, in ESSAYS FROM THE
GHANA-VALCO RENEGOTIATIONS, 1982-85, at 15, 29 (Fui S. Tsikata ed., 1986). Valco's assess-
ment also ignored the $12 million savings from its ten-year tax holiday. Owusu, supra note 15, at
2827. Other benefits not accounted for in Valco's self-assessment included exemptions from im-
port and export duties as well as concessionary rates paid by the company for electricity, water,
port, and wharfage services. The investment was obviously profitable to the company, enabling it
to pay off its $220 million debt well ahead of schedule. Given that their initial risk was negligible
(most of the risk was borne by the U.S. government), the Valco shareholders had obtained a low-
cost smelter serving as an outlet for their alumina from Jamaica at little cost. Casely-Hayford &
Sims, supra at 29.
26. Before the construction of the dam, electricity production in Ghana stood at 35 mega-
watts, but by the early 1980s, residential, commercial, and industrial customers other than Valco
used 220 megawatts, representing a 500% increase in capacity. W. AFR., Nov. 14, 1982. If the
power allocated to these domestic users had been thermally generated, it would have cost the
country up to $36 million more in 1982 or an increase of $100 million annually from its foreign
exchange reserves. Casely-Hayford & Sims, supra note 25, at 29; Ward Saunders, The Valco
View, W. AFR., Jan. 24, 1983, at 194.
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made possible by the VRP.
Despite the apparent mutuality of benefits, the Ghanaian public (as
opposed to Valco officials) 28 began to voice considerable dissatisfaction
with the Ghana-Valco arrangements. 29 Measured against the goal of
supplying large quantities of electricity to support the country's indus-
trial takeoff, the VRP was a major disappointment by 1982.30 Valco's
right to seventy percent of the hydroelectricity left enough power for
only five percent of the country's population of 12 million. This situa-
tion was further aggravated when drought problems at the dam low-
27. In 1982 Valco employed close to 2,500 Ghanaians, a group that made up well over 2% of
the private labor force in the country. Nii K. Bentsi-Enchill, Valco's Role in Ghana, W. AFR.,
Jan. 24, 1983, at 197-98; Casely-Hayford & Sims, supra note 25, at 16. Probably overestimating
the significance of the employees, the former Managing Director of Valco routinely stated that
the withholding taxes paid by the employees constituted a form of revenue to the Government,
while the local spending by such employees on "food, clothing, services, and other life necessi-
ties" boosted local business activity. Saunders, supra note 26.
28. According to the Managing Director of Valco, Ward Saunders,
Valco's commitment to buy for its own use a little over half of the power to be generated by
the Akosombo dam enabled the Volta River Project to proceed. Without Valco's commit-
ment, Akosombo could not have been financed, and Akosombo has been a major element in
Ghana's development .... [By] all applicable standards, Valco's presence in Ghana has
generated the beneficial, social and economic elements to be anticipated from establishing a
large industrial complex in a community.
Saunders, supra note 26. Similarly, the director wrote that
the Volta River Project is an excellent example of co-operation between a host country and
multinational companies to achieve a mutually beneficial productive enterprise. Its accom-
plishments to date should be a source of justifiable pride to Ghana and to its private enter-
prise participants. we further believe that the project will provide increasing benefits to the
people of Ghana in the years to come.
Ward B. Saunders, VRA Electricity Tariff to Valco, THE LEGON OBSERVER, June 27, 1980, at
207, 209.
29. Referring to a lettei by Saunders to the media, a commentator wrote: "Mr. Ward Saun-
ders' letter ... makes interesting reading. The impression one gets from reading his letter is one
of a desperate Managing Director trying to defend his company's position.... I think it is about
time a company like Valco realizes that Ghanaians are fed up with their tricks." Kofi Asante,
Letter, THE LEGON OBSERVER, Dec. 19, 1980, at 352-53. Another writer expressed his frustra-
tion thus:
[T]here could be no better example of an agreement favoring a multinational which subjects
the host nation to abject misery, poverty and a neo-colonial status. It is a perfect model of
"plantation economy type Agreement" which creates islands of affluence in seas of poverty.
The Government of Ghana grants the most far reaching concessions to Valco and gets in
return only pious intentions and unfulfilled promises from Valco and its shareholders.
Volta River Project, Valco and Bauxite Development, THE LEGON OBSERVER, May 29, 1980, at
171. Yet another writer drew these conclusions about the scheme:
[I]t is very difficult if not impossible, not to see the agreement as one sided and favoring
Valco at the expense of Ghana for the odds are heavily against her . . . . When most
Ghanaians came to know the details of this agreement, and its implications not only for the
economy but also national sovereignty, the most spontaneous question they ask is "Why did
Nkrumah sign it?" This is a difficult question despite its apparent simplicity, for it epito-
mizes the whole range of contradictions and difficulties involved in the economic transfor-
mation Nkrumah visualized for Ghana. These can be summed up by one basic question
which most Third World countries still face. How do you achieve economic independence
in a world in which few corporate interests monopolize capital and technology?
Owusu, supra note 15, at 2824.
30. See generally VOLTA RIVER AUTHORITY, 22ND ANNUAL REPORT AND ACCOUNTS
(1983).
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ered energy production and forced an emergency rationing of power, 31
even for essential services such as hospitals.32 The company's monop-
oly over electric power also frustrated the Government's efforts to at-
tract investors, both for a proposed alumina, plant and for the
development of some national industries, 33 because the country could
not guarantee to supply the potential investors with the amount of
energy that they desired.34
Another source of friction in relations between the Government
and Valco Was the thirty-year guarantee of power to Valco at a very
low rate. 35 Valco increased its tariffs three times between 1972 and
197736 under conditions of rising energy costs in the wake of the oil
crises, 37 but these increases still failed to keep up with the prevailing
international price38 for energy and failed to satisfy the Ghanaian pub-
lic. 39 Compared to revenues from the sale of electricity to other users
of the VRA's power, revenues from energy sales to Valco did not cor-
respond to the amount of energy allocated to the company. 40 The
31. Planned power cuts took place in Ghana in December of 1983. Electricity Cuts Begin,
W. AFR., Dec. 12, 1983, at 2912.
32. More Affected by Power Cuts, W. AFR., Jan. 30, 1984, at 248.
33. The targeted sectors included the manganese, iron ore, pulp paper, and textile industries.
See Acres International, Ltd. & Shawinigan Engineering Co., Ltd., Generation Expansion Study
(1975).
34. Bentsi-Enchill, supra note 27, at 199. Because Vaco exercised its right under the Master
Agreement to increase its power allocation, potential investors from Japan, Hungary, and Iran
were unable to obtain guarantees of sufficient power for their proposed schemes. Interview with
Fui Tsikata, in Accra (Oct. 8, 1989) [hereinafter Interview with Fui Tsikata].
35. Even international financial institutions such as the World Bank criticized the existing
rates. K. Ansah, Negotiating Process and Techniques - The Valco Experience 2 (1985) (unpub-
lished manuscript).
36. The third and fourth amendments to the Power Contract in 1972 and 1973 increased the
contractual rate of 2.625 mills/kwh to 2.75 mills/kwh and 3.125 mills/kwh respectively. The
fifth amendment of June 3, 1977, provided that for the years 1976, 1977, and 1978, the rate
would be 4.5 mills/kwh, for 1979, 4.6 mills/kwh, for 1980, 4.75 mills/kwh, and for 1981 and
each year thereafter the rate would be 5 mills/kwh, provided energy consumed each year was not
more than 370,000 times 8760 kwh. But starting in 1976, if the company's energy usage ex-
ceeded 370,000 times 8760 kwh, then the base tariff would be 6.75 mills/kwh. See VRA Electric-
ity Tariffto Valco, THE LEGON OBSERVER, Apr. 11, 1980, at 123-25.
37. How Cheap is Valco's Power, W. AFR., Sept. 1, 1980, at 1647-48 (letter to the editor).
38. It had fallen to one-quarter of the weighted average of the price for power to smelters in
the Western states, one-quarter of the average rate paid by smelters owned by Kaiser, and about
one-fifth the rate paid by Ghanaian consumers. In 1962 the 2.625 mills/kwh rate was equal to
rates paid by aluminum producers in other parts of the world. MINING J., Jan. 14, 1983, at 19.
39. One writer, for instance, characterized the tariff changes as based on Valco's policy of
"dishing out occasional pittances ... whenever it ... [was] likely that some pressure... [was]
about to be exerted on it to pay more for its power." VRA Electricity Tariffto Valco, supra note
36, at 125.
40. For instance, in 1977 Valco used 65% of the VRA's energy and accounted for 41% of
the revenue while the Electricity Corporation of Ghana used 24% and provided 39% of the
revenue. VOLTA RIVER AUTHORITY, supra note 30, at 22, 37. Valco, however, defended its low
rates because it was a baseload user. See Casely-Hayford & Sims, supra note 25, at 22.
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rates paid by the company for other services were similarly
unsatisfactory.4 1
As far as the Ghanaian government was concerned, after nearly
two decades, the project had done little to improve the country's bal-
ance-of-payments position. By 1982, revenues from power payments
to the VRA, taxes paid to the Government, and contributions to a
Valco trust fund totaled only $220 million, most of which went toward
debt-financing. 42 While the low revenues from power sales were the
direct result of the concessionary energy rate, the company's meager
income tax payments could be attributed to a combination of factors.
First, Valco had a lower tax rate as compared to other companies op-
erating in the country. 43 Second, the company could manipulate in-
come figures by conveniently pricing the resources transferred to and
from its shareholders. 44 Finally, the company maintained unsatisfac-
tory tolling arrangements with its shareholders that effectively mini-
mized its taxable income.45
Yet another disappointment to Ghana was Valco's failure to ex-
41. Water consumers paid rates 20 times higher than those of Valco, while port users paid
harbor and wharfage dues 45 times as high as the fees paid by the company. Casely-Hayford &
Sims, supra note 25, at 28. The company's concessionary rates cost the Government up to 2.6
million cedis (about $1 million in U.S. dollars) by the time of the revision. Fui Tsikata, Dealing
with a Transnational Corporation, in ESSAYS FROM THE GHANA-VALCO RENEGOTIATIONS,
1982-85, supra note 25, at 1, 3.
42. Twenty-three million dollars from the Valco Fund was spent on educational and other
charitable projects in Ghana. This was required by the trust deed creating the fund, while the
bulk of the power payments by Valco to the VRA, totalling $161 million, went toward debt
financing under the terms of the agreement. Only $34.5 million went to the Government chest as
revenue after the company started paying taxes in 1980.
43. While other companies paid tax at a 55% rate, Valco's rate was set at 40%. Master
Agreement, supra note 8, art. 30.
44. For an account of how the company's relationship with its shareholders may have facili-
tated its engagement in such restrictive practices, see Kofi Ansah & Fui Tsikata, Legal Fiction
Versus Business Substance, in ESSAYS FROM THE GHANA-VALCO RENEGOTIATIONS, 1982-85,
supra note 25, at 51; see also CAROLINE DOGGART, TAX HAVENS AND THEIR USES (1981);
FRANK LONG, RESTRICTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES, TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS, AND DE-
VELOPMENT (1981); Berle, Subsidiary Corporations and Credit Manipulations, 41 HARV. L. REV.
874 (1927-28); J. Van Horn Jr., Problems, Possibilities and Limitations with Respect to Measures
Against International Tax Avoidance and Evasion, 8 GA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 763 (1978); Charles
R. Irish, Tax Havens, 15 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 449 (1982).
45. Under the arrangements, Valco charged its shareholders a fee corresponding to 60% of
the price of aluminum produced. However, the Government felt that if the arrangements had
been between unrelated parties, a 65% rate would have been more appropriate, thereby increas-
ing the company's earnings. Taxable income was further reduced by the company's consistent
failure to charge shareholders premium rates for superior metal that it produced from time to
time. Quite naturally, under the existing arrangement where the shareholders paid for the supe-
rior metal at prices agreed upon between themselves and Valco, the company was not interested
in maximizing its revenue out of deference to its relationship with its shareholders. Furthermore,
an omission in the original contract regarding the time Valco would be required to tender the
aluminum to its shareholders enabled the company to attract lower tolling fees for its aluminum
products by holding higher inventories during times of falling prices. Casely-Hayford & Sims,
supra note 25, at 28.
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ploit the country's bauxite deposits.46  Not only were concessions
guaranteed to Valco for this purpose, but as further encouragement, a
provision was included for the establishment of a mining company as a
subsidiary of Valco.47 Even though Ghanaian bauxite was of accepta-
ble quality, by 1982 Valco had taken no steps to exploit and use that
bauxite. Valco cited high financial costs, problems in the aluminum
industry,48 and Valco's conviction that such an undertaking would not
be useful for the country's development as reasons for its decision.49
Others, however, disagreed with the company, citing evidence indicat-
ing that an alumina plant was both economically and technically feasi-
ble.50  Such critics also hypothesized that Valco was reneging on its
contractual promise as part of an industry-wide strategy to avoid a
total integration of the aluminum industry in any Third World
country.51
The original agreement was criticized for reducing the possibility
of other beneficial linkage effects in the country. For instance, Valco
preserved its option to transport alumina from Jamaica in ships other
than Ghana's shipping line.52 Also, although local substitutes were
available, the company imported most of the smelter's construction
and operation materials. From Ghana's perspective, Valco's activities
46. Ghana hoped that the company would mine and process the country's bauxite for use at
the smelter. Under the prevailing arrangement, raw bauxite was produced in Ghana by British
interests and exported to Britain for processing into alumina. Ironically, Valco then imported
alumina from bauxite mines in the United States and the Caribbean (owned by its shareholders)
to be processed into aluminum ingot at the smelter. Subsequently, Kaiser and Reynolds ex-
ported this ingot for use in the other plants or sale in other markets.
47. Master Agreement, supra note 8, art. 11(C).
48. Valco projected that an alumina plant to process Ghanaian bauxite would cost about
$800 million. Saunders, supra note 26, at 196.
49. As Valco put it, "[A] detailed study has shown that the project has a negative cash-flow
for the first seven years of operation and a very low rate of return .... [S]uch a project will not
solve Ghana's economic problems even if it could be financed." Ronald W. Graham, Structural
Problems in the World Economy. A Case Study of the Ghana- Valco Renegotiations, in ESSAYS
FROM THE GHANA-VALCo RENEGOTIATIONS, 1982-85, supra note 25, at 87, 100.
50. These include the studies done in 1966 by Kaiser Engineers, in 1975 by the Bauxite
Alumina Study Company Limited (jointly owned by Valco's shareholders and a Japanese con-
sortium), and in 1977 by the ALUTERV-FKI, a Hungarian chemical company. See Tsikata,
supra note 41, at 6.
51. The single exception was in Surinam where the industry was fully integrated. Even then,
Alcoa, the company located there, never believed the colony would ever be granted independence
by the Dutch. The alleged strategy, if indeed true, was applied in Guinea, Jamaica, and Guyana,
where bauxite mines and alumina plants, but no smelters, could be found. It is also seen in
Cameroon, which has a smelter, but neither bauxite mines nor alumina plants. This contrasts
with the situation in developed countries like the United States, France, and Australia where the
industry is fully integrated. Volta River Project, Valco and Bauxite Development, supra note 29,
at 174. Constructing a smelter in Ghana would not only have reduced Valco's bargaining posi-
tion in the country, but also would have enhanced Ghana's attempts to become an integrated
producer of aluminum. See Graham, supra note 49, at 100.
52. Master Agreement, supra note 8, art. 24.
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contributed little to the generation of skills in the country, and the
company remained a kind of enclave industry cut off from the rest of
Ghana by the company's maintenance of its own road system, security
network, school, and hospital. This arrangement severely reduced any
possibilities for the company to have cultural, social, economic, or
technological contact with mainstream Ghanaian development. 53
The Ghanaian legal community had also grown quite uneasy about
technical problems in the agreement that threatened to limit the coun-
try's sovereign rights. Some of the stabilization clauses were perceived
as overreaching and as providing an overly broad protection of the
Valco investment,54 while other clauses, especially those on taxation, 55
appeared to restrict unduly the government's ability to apply general
fiscal policies to Valco. Equally disturbing were attempts to freeze the
applicable contract law as of January 22, 196256 - attempts that
raised serious conflict of laws57 and constitutional law problems. 58
53. Imperialism and the Volta Dam II, W. AFR., Mar. 31, 1980, at 572 ("Government regu-
lation of the operations of the smelter was thus minimized, allowing Valco to become a typical
enclave industry, apparently isolated from the rest of Ghana and replete with its own roads,
security, port, school and hospital. Cultural, social, economic and technological contact with the
mainstream of Ghanaian development is therefore minimized.").
54. For instance, the provision protecting the interests of the shareholders against nationali-
zation read:
In the event of expropriation of, nationalization of, or intervention in, the whole or a sub-
stantial part of any of the properties, rights or interests whatsoever of Valco, or in the event
of expropriation or nationalization of any of the shares or securities of Valco being in either
case expropriation or nationalization, or being intervention by the government or any
Ghanaian authority, then at the request of any of the shareholders of Valco the shares or
remaining shares held by that shareholder should forthwith be nationalized or expropriated.
Master Agreement, supra note 8, art. 38(B). When such nationalization has taken place, "all
liabilities and funded debts of Valco shall become the responsibility, liabilities and funded debt of
the Government." Id., art. 38(C).
Arguably, this provision extended protection not only to the original investment of Valco, but
also to future acquisitions, regardless of their relevance to the company's activities. Thus, it
could be triggered by the government's acquisition of non-business-related property owned by
Valco, such as a stretch of beach used by its executive officers. Akilagpa Sawyerr, Some Legal
Issues Arising from the Negotiation of the Valco Agreement, in ESSAYS FROM THE GHANA-VALCO
RENEGOTIATIONS, 1982-1985, supra note 25, at 60, 66-67.
55. The contract provided that taxes were to be assessed "in accordance with the provisions
of the Income Tax Ordinance of 1943 as amended and in force on [2-1-62] without any regard to
any amendment made subsequent to the said dates, whether or not such amendment is deemed to
have come into operation on or before the said date." Master Agreement, supra note 8, art.
30(C).
56. Id. art. 47.
57. The conflict of laws problems had to do with the difference between the choice by the
parties of a law to govern their contract - the proper law of the contract - and the incorpora-
tion in the contract of a specified body of laws. ALBERT VENN DICEY & J.H.C. MORRIS, CON-
FLICT OF LAWS 732-34 (1975). The latter is a convenient procedure for making the incorporated
law part of the contract. The significant result is that subsequent alterations in law do not affect
the intent of the law as incorporated. Unlike the incorporated law, changes in the proper law can
affect the operation of the contract. Roland Brown, Choice of Law Provisions in Concessions and
Related Contracts, 39 MOD. L. REV. 625, 638 (1976). Interestingly, although Valco agreed to
the adoption of Ghanaian law as the proper law of the contract, the company expected that such
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Other provisions purporting to limit the legislative power of the state
were also soundly criticized. 59
Finally, the absence of adequate safeguards against industrial pol-
lution in the agreement worried Ghanaian environmentalists who were
alarmed that the smelter's continuous discharges of fluoride would
have a disastrous effect on nearby fishing and harbor communities.6°
II. RENEGOTIATING THE GHANA-VALCO AGREEMENT
As a result of the above criticisms, the Ghanaian government felt
pressured to review its agreement with Valco.6t The main grounds for
review were that the agreement was no longer equitable62 given
changed economic circumstances and that governmental sovereignty
over natural resources empowered Ghana to restructure the natural
resource development contract with Valco in the best interests of the
country.63 The latter argument was used successfully in connection
with investment agreements 64 that were seen to unduly restrict the
host country's ability to exploit its natural resources for effective eco-
nomic development;65 this argument was particularly compelling
where the investors reaped excessive and windfall profits. 66
law would be restricted to the laws and regulations in force as of January 1962. This attempt to
freeze the application of new legislation to the contract was clearly nugatory because the proper
law, by definition, includes all legislative amendments.
58. The constitutional law of Ghana as of January 1962, recognized the power of the legisla-
ture to change any part of the law as it applied to any matter within its jurisdiction. Any refer-
ence to the law as of that date would include that recognition. Therefore, a clause in the
agreement attempting to freeze the law by limiting legislative competence was inconsistent with a
basic cardinal constitutional principle, and thus invalid.
59. The most provocative was article 36, Which read:
(T]he Government undertakes that no general or special legislative or administrative mea-
sure or act whatsoever of or emanating from Ghana or any Ghanaian authority shall annul,
amend, revoke or modify the provision of, or prevent or hinder the due and effective per-
formance of the terms of, the Scheduled Contracts or any of them ....
Master Agreement, supra note 8, art. 36(A).
60. Owusu, supra note 15, at 2828.
61. Id.
62. In international law, the doctrine of changed circumstances is recognized as a basis for
revising investment agreements. See Zakariya, Impact of Changing Circumstances on the Revi-
sion of Petroleum Contracts, MIDDLE EAST ECON. SURV., Supp. to Vol. 12, No. 37, July II,
1969, at 1; Rainer Geiger, Unilateral Change of Economic Development Agreements, 23 INT'L &
COMP. L.Q. 73, 91-93 (1974).
63. Sawyerr, supra note 54, at 62.
64. See generally GEORGE ELIAN, THE PRINCIPLE OF SOVEREIGNTY OVER NATURAL RE-
SOURCES (1979); M.S. RAIAN, SOVEREIGNTY OVER NATURAL RESOURCES (1978).
65. Sawyerr, supra note 54, at 63-64.
66. For example, after the escalation of oil prices in the 1970s, Britain and Norway, citing
the need to better regulate the resource, unilaterally changed the fiscal regime for North Sea Oil
to avoid excessive profits going to oil companies at the expense of their citizens. Michael Faber
& Roland Brown, Changing the Rules of the Game Political Risk, Instability and Fair Play in
Mineral Concession Contracts, 2 THIRD WORLD Q. 100, 112 (1980).
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Pointing to the absence of review provisions in the agreement and
relying on the principle of the sanctity of contracts, 67 Valco opposed
the efforts to review the contract. 68 The company argued that like a
bargain struck at the market exchange, the agreement represented a
set of benefits to be preserved 69 regardless of subsequent unforeseen
developments that may have adversely affected the expectations of
either party to the contract. 70 To forestall the possible counterargu-
ment that it had accepted the principle of review by approving piece-
meal power rate increases in the 1970s, 7 , Valco emphasized that those
early concessions had been made in a spirit of magnanimity. 72 The
company even resorted to what were in fact ad hominem arguments by
pointing to the propriety of the principles and vision of Kwame
Nkrumah. Valco argued that any contract Nkrumah entered into
could not be unfair.73 To emphasize the point, the company repeated
ad nauseam remarks of the late President indicating that the agree-
ment was equitable. 74
The government of the Provisional National Defense Council
(PNDC) was ushered in after a successful military coup on December
31, 1981. The head of the PNDC, Flight Lieutenant Jerry John Rawl-
67. The doctrine, which advocates strict adherence to contractual obligations, has also been
recognized in international law. See Joseph L. Kunz, The Meaning and Range of the Norm of
Pacta Sunt Servanda, 39 AM. J. INT'L L. 180 (1945); Peter D. Gaffney, Contract Sanctity Going
the Way of the Dinosaur, OIL AND GAS J., July 2, 1984, at 28.
68. Graham, supra note 49, at 95.
69. Samuel K.B. Asante, Stability of Contractual Relations in the Transnational Investment
Process, 20 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 401, 404 (1979).
70. This is typical of TNCs, as they often justify their high returns on the grounds of the
exceptional skill and risks they had shown in undertaking the investment projects. See generally
Faber & Brown, supra note 66, at 115.
71. Graham, supra note 49, at 95.
72. It probably considered those increases to be ex gratia payments. See Tsikata, supra note
42, at 3.
73. In response to charges that the Ghana-Valco agreement was onerous for Ghana, a com-
pany official argued, "It is... ironic indeed that Dr. Nkrumah, who signed the Valco Agreement
on behalf of the Government of Ghana and who is the author of 'Neo-Colonialism: The Last
Stage of Imperialism,' should be accused of imposing upon Ghana a neo-colonial status." Ward
B. Saunders, The Volta River Project, Valco and Bauxite Development, THE LEGON OBSERVER,
Sept. 19, 1980, at 229; see also Tsikata, supra note 41, at 2.
74. In defending the original arrangements, Ward Saunders wrote,
Let me close by quoting Dr. Nkrumah on the negotiations which resulted in the Valco
arrangement: ". .. I wish to emphasize that in all our negotiations with the management of
Valco they have always demonstrated a genuine desire to arrange this company in a way
which would be fair and equitable to both them and to Ghana. An example of this good
faith of Valco is their initiative in creating a special (Valco) Fund which will guarantee to
Ghana more revenue from the project than could be expected under normal conditions."
Saunders, supra note 73, at 231-32.
The company also wrote, "[T]he view that President Nkrumah, with full knowledge and
advice from acknowledged experts, did not obtain a fair and equitable arrangement for Ghana is
based largely on myth, which disparages the abilities of Ghana's first leader." Saunders, supra
note 26, at 195.
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ings, arrived with a vision of social revolution 75 and with the intention
to transform the country into a participatory democracy. 76  Real
power, according to Rawlings, lay with the people, and they exercised
this power by being involved in overseeing the affairs of state. Accord-
ingly, every citizen was charged with supervising public officials and
judging offenders. Through constant vigilance, Rawlings's supporters
hoped that inequality and exploitation would be eliminated from their
society. 77  External forces, according to the new Ghanaian govern-
ment, were as responsible as the unscrupulous elite for the continuous
economic subjugation of the country;78 thus, Ghanaians were also to
act as watchdogs against the excesses of foreigners operating in the
country.79
As part of this wave of civil accountability, the Government called
for scrutinizing all foreign investment arrangements in order to ensure
that most of the benefits were not going to the foreign investor at the
expense of the Ghanaian economy.80 The VPR caught the attention of
the Government by virtue of its sheer size and potential importance to
the economy.8 I The VPR was quickly earmarked as one of the ar-
rangements with external forces that needed to be scrutinized. 82
The PNDC's determination to review the Ghana-Valco arrange-
ment immediately became apparent to the Valco executives. For the
first time in the history of the project, Valco was dealing with a gov-
ernment that showed serious opposition to the existing arrangement
and refused to be persuaded by the economic rationalizations which
had typically convinced officials in the previous regimes.83 There
75. Graham, supra note 49, at 94.
76. The Return of Jerry Rawlings, W. AFR., Jan. 11, 1982, at 68.
77. The institutional changes made to accommodate these objectives included forming de-
fence committees in every community, neighborhood, and workplace. Various investigating
commissions and public tribunals were also established to involve the public in the administra-
tion of justice. These tribunals operate alongside the traditional courts. Although public hear-
ings are held, the courts are "not fettered by the technical rules which in the past perverted the
course of justice and enabled criminals to go free." Id. at 69.
78. Workers Demonstrate Against Valco Cuts, W. AFR., June 28, 1982, at 1726.
79. Graham, supra note 49, at 97.
80. Bringing the People into Decision-Making, W. AFR., Jan. 11, 1982, at 71, 73.
81. It employed over 1% of the national labor force and was the third major foreign ex-
change earner for the country after cocoa and gold. Casely-Hayford & Sims, supra note 25, at 16.
82. Other investors targeted were Firestone and Unilever. See Kwesi Garbrah, Development
and the Debt Trap, W. AFR., Apr. 30, 1984, at 922.
83. For example, during the People's National Party (PNP) Administration of Dr. Limann,
the VRA approached Valco to revise the rate structure from 12 mills/kwh in 1981 to 18 mills/
kwh by 1983. Valco's reply, repeated even during the early days of the PNDC, was that
"Ghana's inflationary conditions and the level of the exchange rate" made it commercially im-
possible for them to accept more than a small increase in the rate. Telegram from Ward Saun-
ders (managing director of Valco) to the VRA (Apr. 6, 1982), quoted in Graham, supra note 49,
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could be no doubt that the PNDC's approach to the Valco arrange-
ment was in sharp contrast to the "parochialism of past political parti-
sanship and posturing" 84 that crippled previous efforts to revise the
agreement. 85
Obviously disturbed by the increasingly critical pronouncements
from the Government, the company remained lukewarm in its attitude
toward the PNDC. Before long, rumors surfaced of the company's
plans to destabilize the new Government. 86 Matters took a dramatic
turn when the PNDC government expelled three Valco employees for
spying.87 Investigations later revealed that these Valco employees had
reportedly engaged in systematic maneuvers to crush the popular up-
rising and to abort the revolutionary process going on in the country. 88
Valco's express regret at the deportation orders only incensed the
public. 89
Amidst this tension, the Government authorized the Secretary of
Lands and Natural Resources to evaluate Valco's operations in Ghana
and to recommend ways of reviewing the Ghana-Valco arrange-
ments.90 A technical committee was set up under the chairmanship of
Mr. A.N.E. Amissah, a former member of the Board of Trustees of the
Valco Fund, 91 to assist in the review. Over an eight-month period, the
committee made a detailed study of the Ghana-Valco agreement and
other relevant documents. They collated information from national
agencies linked to the project92 and gathered information from inter-
national sources about the worldwide operations of Kaiser and Reyn-
at 96. For political reasons, the PNP did not request the major increases recommended by inter-
national experts.
84. Owusu, supra note 15, at 2826.
85. One writer considers the failure of successive governments between 1966 and 1982 to
revise the VRP to be "a direct reflection of their subservience to imperialism." Graham, supra
note 49, at 95.
86. Workers Demonstrate Against Valco Cuts, W. AFR., June 28, 1982, at 1726.
87. These expelled employees were Terry Dean Swanny and Clyde Maclean Spears from the
United States and Siegfried Prangenberg from the Federal Republic of Germany. Foreign Intelli-
gence Agents Arrested, DAILY GRAPHIC, Mar. 5, 1982, at 1.
88. Id. at 4.
89. Denying the allegations of espionage, the company expressed outrage at the suggestion
that they would be involved in plans to overthrow the Government. Foreign Intelligence Agents
Arrested, supra note 87, at 1, 4. The company's response was perceived to be insincere and only
strengthened the Government's resolve to revise the agreement. As the Government warned in a
public statement: "We shall resist with our very lives, if necessary, all attempts by any forces
who place their narrow interests above those of our country and our people." Id. at 4.
90. Tsikata, supra note 41, at 6.
91. As a member of the board, he had criticized key parts of the agreement that set out how
the Fund's contributions were to be calculated.
92. The principal agencies that were contacted included the Bank of Ghana, the Customs
and Excise Department, the Internal Revenue Service, the Tema Development Council, the
Ghana Water and Sewerage Corporation, and the Environmental Protection Council. The insti-
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olds, Valco's shareholders. In June 1982 the committee came out with
findings sharply criticizing the company and recommended
renegotiations.93
Despite increased pressure, the Government ignored public de-
mands to nationalize the smelter 94 out of prudent recognition that
such a move not only would have been economically unrewarding,95
but also would have risked a diplomatic confrontation with the United
States.96  Such a confrontation would have had potentially adverse
consequences both on U.S. aid to the country97 and on the country's
foreign investment climate. 98  Instead, the Government accepted the
tutions provided summaries of their relations with Valco and recommended strategies for chal-
lenging the multinational company. Interview with Fui Tsikata, supra note 34.
93. In its report the committee observed that for 15 years, in.the face of extreme economic
adversity, Ghana had continued to discharge its obligations under the Master Agreement as part
of its desire to maintain cordial relations with the company, and also to extend maximum protec-
tion to foreign investment in the country. However, as the committee concluded, the Valco
agreements had placed an intolerable strain on the country's good intentions. It was, therefore,
necessary for the Government to take urgent steps to publicly disclose and correct gross dispari-
ties shown to exist in the nature and working of the Valco agreement. In particular, it urged the
Government to request from the company a new set of legal arrangements that would be equita-
ble and just to the company and that would also hold a reasonable balance between the interests
of Valco and the government of Ghana. Id.
94. Through strikes and demonstrations, Valco workers protested what they considered to be
politically motivated company layoffs and production cutbacks in June 1982. The workers urged
the government either to unilaterally introduce changes to the terms of the agreement, or to
nationalize the company's interests. Workers Demonstrate Against Valco Cuts, supra note 86.
95. Nationalization of the Valco smelter would have had little impact on the country's econ-
omy given the poor development of Ghana's aluminum sector in a world industry dominated by
a few giant companies who regulate the production and sale of the various aluminum inputs and
end-products. To be used by the smelter, Ghana's bauxite would need to be processed into alu-
mina. With no existing domestic processing facilities, it is doubtful that the country would have
been able to finance the establishment of processing facilities from its own sources. Any attempts
to purchase alumina from the aluminum cartel would have been counterproductive because the
cartel members either would have refused to sell or simply would have inflated the prices beyond
the reach of the fledgling Ghanaian industry. Even if the Ghanaian government could have
afforded a processing smelter, it would have been difficult to sell the aluminum in the world
market as the aluminum cartel would probably have retaliated by boycotting Ghanaian alumi-
num products. The feasibility of successfully operating the smelter was another uncertainty
under the original arrangement. The highly technical aspects of the operations were reserved to
expatriates so that after nationalizing the smelter, Ghana would have had no skilled personnel to
operate it.
96. This was possible because the agreement authorized the assumption of the rights of
Valco's shareholders by U.S. public agencies should those rights ever be threatened. Even in the
absence of the contractual provision, a similar result could have been inferred under international
law, permitting the U.S. government to seek redress on behalf of Valco if its Ghanaian interests
were nationalized. For an historical perspective on this right of intervention, see Eduardo
Jimenez de Arechaga, State Responsibility for the Nationalization of Foreign-Owned Property 11
N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 179 (1978); John F. Williams, International Law and The Property of
Aliens, 1928 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 1 (1979).
97. Under the terms of the Hickenlooper amendment, the U.S. government must cut off all
aid to every country that nationalizes the interest of any U.S. investor without payment of what
the United States considers adequate compensation. 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e) (1990); George J. Eder,
Expropriation, Hickenlooper and Hereafter, 4 INT'L LAw. 611 (1970).
98. Like other developing countries, Ghana is continually seeking to attract foreign private
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committee's recommendations and, on December 7, 1982, invited
Valco to renegotiate the agreement. Valco's prompt acceptance of the
Government's invitation made it unnecessary to implement a standby
plan to seek a judicial determination of the country's right to renegoti-
ate the terms of the investment agreement in the absence of a review
provision.99
At the formal opening of the renegotiations on February 14, 1983,
Ghana's demands included increases in the power, water, wharfage,
and port rates, as well as the normalization of taxation arrangements.
Other issues tabled for discussion pertained to Ghanaian representa-
tion on the board of directors of Valco, a review of the tolling arrange-
ments between Valco and its shareholders, the adoption of stricter
environmental controls by Valco, and finally, a discussion of Valco's
role in the integration of the aluminum industry in Ghana. t°
These demands - which in effect meant a complete overhaul of
the original agreement - caught the Valco team off guard because it
had arrived at the meeting only expecting to tackle the usual request
for an increase in the energy rate. Valco officials had no immediate
response by way of tangible proposals or counterarguments. They
could only beg the indulgence of the Ghana team to entertain more
specific proposals later in the week. 101 As deliberations proceeded, it
became apparent that the Valco team had not come with a sufficient
mandate to discuss the Ghanaian proposals, and five days into the ne-
gotiations an adjournment was granted at the request of Valco to en-
able it to obtain authorization from its shareholders to negotiate the
new issues that had emerged. 10 2
The second round of negotiations opened two months later on
April 13, 1983. It was much more productive than the first. Negotia-
tions ended on a positive note as agreement was quickly reached on
increasing the fees paid by the company for water and for the use of
port facilities.
and public financial inflows from investors who need to be assured of the stability of their opera-
tions. Any unilateral government action redressing the imbalance in the Ghana-Valco contract
would have been seen as evidence of the government's general policy towards investment agree-
ments and would have provoked profound suspicion about its good faith intentions. Conceiva-
bly, the U.S. government and Valco's shareholders would have mounted a hostile campaign
against any further investment projects by U.S. nationals in Ghana. In the past, attempts were
made to block loans to countries that nationalized U.S. private property without adequate com-
pensation. Marshall T. Mays, The Protection of Overseas Investment, in MULTINATIONAL COR-
PORATIONS AND GOVERNMENTS 61, 72 (Patrick M. Boarman & Hans Scholhammer eds., 1975).
99. See generally Sawyerr, supra note 54.
100. Interview with Akilagpa Sawyerr, in Accra (Oct. 5, 1989).
101. Interview with Fui Tsikata, supra note 34.
102. Talks with Valco Resume, W. AFR., Apr. 18, 1983, at 971.
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During the third round of discussions, the parties had nearly
reached an agreement on a price to be paid for electricity when Valco
suddenly requested that an allowance be made for the extra costs of
operating in Ghana. 10 3 Not long after, Valco repudiated a principle
agreed to in the second round, that of fixing the energy rate by refer-
ence to the weighted average world price. 1° 4 When the company
failed to come out with a meaningful alternative t0 5 the Ghanaian team
walked out of the negotiations on May 27, 1983, alleging bad faith on
the part of Valco.106 The walkout seemed to be a deliberate maneuver
by the Government to test the company's seriousness in the
negotiations. 107
The stalemate continued for a while, with Valco holding out in
hopes that widespread dissatisfaction with the Government's austerity
program would result in a change of leadership. 10 8 In any case, Valco
stood to gain from political infighting that was occurring between
groups represented in the PNDC. t° 9 Additionally, public outcries
against how the Government had handled investigations into the ab-
duction and murder of three judges and an army officer' 10 had further
103. Valco argued that it incurred increased labor costs as a result of the unfavorable ex-
change rate of the country's currency.
104. Graham, supra note 49, at 104.
105. The company proposed a base power rate of 12.5 mills/kwh to be indexed to a base of
80 cents/lb for the average realized price of primary aluminum for the four major North Ameri-
can aluminum companies, Alcoa, Alcan, Kaiser, and Reynolds. The Ghana team was soon to
discover that the four company average realized aluminum price had never in its history reached
80 cents/lb, and at the time of the negotiations, was in the range of 55 cents/lb. Making the
necessary adjustments under the Valco proposal would in effect have set the power rate at 8.6
mills/kwh, a rate that the government considered inadequate.
106. A Government statement announcing the breakdown of talks observed that throughout
the first rounds the Valco team
appeared to have hardened their position on the major issue of the power rate thereby mak-
ing any progress on that or other issues quite impossible .... [For example,] in response to
persistent pressure from the Ghanaian side to come forward with realistic proposals which
could form the basis for further discussion, . . . [Valco proposed a rate that] in present
circumstances, is exactly the same as the rate they pay under the current arrangement, and
which in the long run term is even lower than the rate the government had rejected as
inadequate in the second round ....
The Ghanaian team therefore concluded from "the present posture of Valco [that] further talks
[were] unlikely to produce the kind of results which would be acceptable to the government and
people of Ghana." Ghana- Valco Talks Deadlock, W. AFR., June 6, 1983, at 1362.
107. In a statement announcing the termination of the discussions, the head of the Govern-
ment team charged that Valco had "treated with contempt Ghana's invitation to engage in seri-
ous good faith negotiations," and cautioned that the Government was committed to its people
and would not refrain from taking any steps it considered necessary to enable it defend their
interests and discharge its duty to them. Interview with Akilagpa Sawyerr, supra note 100.
108. Graham, supra note 49, at 104.
109. At that time, the New Democratic Movement and the June 4 Movement, both left-wing
organizations, were divided on the issue of the Government's implementation of IMF policies in
its economic recovery program.
110. There were strong suspicions that the Government was trying to cover up the involve-
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weakened the Government's attempts at collective leadership. There
was, therefore, the possibility - however remote - that through its
intransigence, the company would eventually be dealing with an in-
creasingly less effective administration.
Surprisingly, after a three month lull the Valco team called for the
resumption of talks. A combination of factors pushed Valco back to
the bargaining table. First, the company was probably responding to
the Government's terse warning during the breakdown of talks that if
Valco did not show more seriousness in future negotiations, the Gov-
ernment was already "studying very carefully a range of measures to
obtain its objectives by other means.""' Additionally, a noticeable
waning of left wing influence in the Government coalition,' 1 2 a reduc-
tion in anticapitalist propaganda, and increased governmental over-
tures to the International Monetary Fund may have convinced Valco
that the Ghanaian investment climate had improved and that the com-
pany could continue to operate successfully in Ghana. 1 3 Further-
more, a change in management at Valco may have affected the
decision to return to the bargaining table. The new managing director
generally was seen as a more realistic and practical negotiator than his
predecessor. "14
When discussions resumed in the fourth round, the negotiating ses-
sions went uninterrupted until the entire process was concluded in the
sixth round. Following approval of the preliminary drafts, the revised
agreement was executed on January 30, 1985, by representatives of the
government, shareholders, and other parties involved in the project.'15
III. ANALYSIS OF THE REVISED AGREEMENT
In addition to accepting fee increases for use of land, water, and
port facilities,'16 Valco agreed to pay a base power rate of seventeen
ment of two members of the PNDC in the atrocious crimes. One of them, Joshua Amartey-
Kwei, was subsequently tried by a public tribunal, found guilty, and executed, while the other,
Captain Kojo Tsikata, was exonerated.
111. Statement by the Government of Ghana (June 1983), quoted in Graham, supra note 49,
at 10.
112. The left wing was weakened by a government purge of the June 4 Movement supporters
following an unsuccessful coup attempt by two leaders of the Movement.
113. Graham, supra note 49, at 105-06.
114. Interview with Fui Tsikata, supra note 49. John Miller had taken over from Ward
Saunders.
115. Tsikata, supra note 41, at 8.
116. The water rates were increased to U.S. $1.36 for every 100 gallons of water supplied, the
property rate to U.S. $265,000, and harbor dues and wharfage to U.S. $0.275 per ton and U.S.
$0.225 per ton respectively, on all cargo loaded or unloaded at the quay. Third Amendment to
the Smelter Site Lease Between the Government of Ghana and the Volta Aluminium Company,
Ltd. (as amended through Jan. 1985), art. 2(e); Third Amendment to the Port Agreement Dated
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mills/kwh that was linked to a metal price so that the government
could share in the company's market risk. 1 17 When energy production
was reduced as a result of conditions of force majeure,118 the available
power was to be allocated according to a predetermined formula with
priority given to essential services.' 19 The tolling arrangements be-
tween Valco and its shareholders were revised to require Valco to
charge the shareholders a higher tolling fee.' 20 To close the loophole
in the old agreement that had enabled Valco to value production at
times when charges were low, production was now valued at the end
of the month in which it was cast. 12 1
As a condition to Valco's right to import duty-free materials
needed for the smelter's operation, duties were now imposed on a
number of items including personal vehicles, furniture, fittings, food,
commissary supplies, and maintenance supplies for hospital, housing,
and clubs. 122 Although the company was exempted from paying im-
port duties on plant vehicles, 23 safety equipment, quality control
Feb. 8, 1962 Between the Government of Ghana and Volta Aluminium Company Ltd., art.
5(d)(A) (Apr. 16, 1984); Water Agreement Between the Government of Ghana and the Volta
Aluminium Company Ltd. (as amended through Jan. 1985), arts. 5, 10, & 25.
117. The base power rate of 17 mills/kwh is set for 2700 gigawatt hours (gwh) to 2760 gwh
of energy offered to Valco, but if less than 2700 gwh is supplied, then the base power rate is to be
reduced by x/275 where x equals 2760 minus the number of gigawatt hours of energy supplied to
Valco. In calculating the rate, one-third of the base power rate is taken as a constant, while the
remaining two-thirds is adjusted by multiplying the base power rate by a fraction determined at
six monthly intervals, of which the numerator is the average London Metal Exchange cash settle-
ment price for aluminum ingot and the denominator is 73 U.S. cents/lb. However, in no event is
the price payable by Valco for electricity to be less than 10 mills/kwh. Power Contract Between
the Volta River Authority and the Volta Aluminium Company (as amended through Jan. 1985),
art. 12(A) [hereinafter Revised Power Contract].
118. Conditions offorce majeure refer to those events which the parties to a contract agree to
be outside their control and the happening of which would excuse the performance of their con-
tractual obligations. See BLACK'S LAW DICnONARY 581 (5th ed. 1979).
119. Under normal conditions, Valco would be guaranteed 2760 gwh of energy but should
power production at the dam fall below 4343 gwh, it would receive a reduced energy allocation.
This reduced portion is calculated under the assumption that the company would take 73% and
90% of the first and second cuts respectively, and thereafter, receive only sufficient power for
maintenance. On the other hand, should energy production exceed 4343 gwh, Valco would have
had the option of purchasing the excess energy at a price that takes into account the economic
benefits Ghana would derive from increased operations by Valco. Id. art. 5(A).
120. This was initially set at 68% of the London Metal Exchange (LME) cash settlement
price per ton of aluminum ingot but was to be reduced to 62% after three years. Long Term
Tolling Contract Between Volta Aluminum Company and Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical Cor-
poration (as amended through Jan. 1985), art. 14(A).
121. Id. art 17(E).
122. Other dutiable imports include (a) printing and drafting supplies and equipment, library
supplies, stationery, and data processing supplies and equipment, (b) medical supplies and equip-
ment, (c) school and recreational supplies, (d) incentive awards, (e) safety awards, and (f) cloth.
Master Agreement Between the Government of Ghana and the Volta Aluminium Company (as
amended through Jan. 1985), art. 20(B)(ii)(a) [hereinafter Revised Master Agreement].
123. The term includes buses, pickups, trucks, ambulances, and fireworks used solely for
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equipment, laboratory equipment, and other items, 24 it was required
to pay customs duties on materials used in production including alu-
mina, fuel, lubricant, and equipment. Necessary quantities of good
quality production materials of these types were available in Ghana at
commercial prices.' 25
Other fiscal matters agreed upon included the imposition on Valco
of a forty-six percent income tax, customs duties, stamp duties, road
taxes on vehicles that Valco operates outside the smelter site,1 26 and
other taxes of a "minor character."1 27  Where changes in the
Ghanaian tax laws significantly reduced economic benefits to the Gov-
ernment or to Valco from the operation of the smelter, adjustments
were to be made to ensure that the affected party would continue to
enjoy the same economic benefits it would have enjoyed but for the
change in law.' 28 A withholding tax of five percent also was placed
on all dividends to Valco shareholders that had accumulated by the
end of December 1981.129 Further dividends would be withheld at
fifteen percent or the lower rate prescribed by any applicable treaty to
which Ghana was a party.1 30
The purported limitation of Ghana's sovereignty under the original
agreement was solved in the revised agreement by amending the of-
fending clauses to provide the desired protection of Valco's investment
while acknowledging Ghana's sovereign rights.13' The nationalization
and choice of law clauses were revised to incorporate principles of in-
ternational law to guide disputes that might arise under the con-
tract.132 Further, the provision freezing the tax law as applied to
plant operations, and excludes any such vehicles made generally available for the use of any
Valco employees.
124. These included equipment for training, development, janitorial needs, and laundry. See
Revised Master Agreement, supra note 122, art. 20(B)(ii)(b).
125. Id. art. 20(C).
126. Id. art. 30(A).
127. A change is minor if, alone or in combination, it does not exceed $100,000 in one year
or $250,000 over a five year period. Id. art. 30(A)(v)(a) & (b).
128. If the affected party is the government, the adjustments should not result in the imposi-
tion of any additional burden on Valco in excess of the benefit Valco may have derived from the
change in the laws of Ghana. For this purpose economic benefits are considered to be signifi-
cantly reduced if the amount involved in a given year exceeds $100,000, or if the change affects
more than one year prior to the next review, if the cumulative amount involved before such
review exceeds $250,000. Id. art. 30(C).
129. A total of $12,304,000 had accumulated in dividends.
130. Revised Master Agreement, supra note 122, art. 30(E).
131. Under article 47, the agreement is governed by and construed in accordance with the
law of Ghana and applicable rules of international law. The parties agreed that the legislative
competence of Ghana as a sovereign is defined by its constitutional instruments and might only
be exercised within the limits ordained by established rules of international law. Id. art. 47.
132. Sawyerr, supra note 54, at 69.
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Valco in 1962 was replaced by a provision that recognized Ghana's
power to alter its tax regime. Finally, it was agreed that contract re-
views would be conducted every five years, guided by the principle of
normalizing operations of the company. 33
Under the new formula for determining power rates, Ghana shares
in the risks of production, and stands to gain from higher power rates
when world metal prices increase. The ability of the VRA to allocate
energy 34 to essential services whenever energy output is reduced at
the dam eliminates the cost previously borne by the government under
the original contract to supply Valco at the expense of local needs.
Greater revenue would also be available from higher taxes and in-
creased payments by the company for water and port services. The
imposition of duties on various imports of Valco is a laudable one as it
signals the reduction of a cost hitherto incurred by the country under
its previous "no import duty" policy. The revision of the tolling ar-
rangements would significantly increase the taxable income of the
company. Under normal conditions, 3 5 the Government would gross
at least forty-three million dollars in revenues each year. 136
The renegotiated agreement is also beneficial for Valco. While
Valco appeared to have "lost" by agreeing to pay higher fees for
Ghana's services, the increased cost of production is not expected to
affect the company's international competitiveness. The new base
power rate of seventeen mills/kwh is still considerably lower than the
rates paid by other smelters worldwide1 37 and it is also lower than the
133. The parties agreed to meet during the last quarter of 1988 and every five years thereafter
to consider whether the agreement was operating fairly to each side. They also agreed to discuss
any problems that arise from the practical operation of the agreement. At each review, the
parties would examine the base power rate and make any adjustments necessary to ensure that
this rate equals the average world price of power supplied to aluminum smelters. They would
adjust the tolling charges to ensure that the portion of the value of aluminum produced but not
covered by the tolling charge includes an amount representing the value of alumina purchased on
long term contracts and of alumina freight, and amounts representing services provided by the
Valco shareholders valued on an arms length basis, i.e., as if a third party were selling Valco's
entire production in the form of ingot on the market. Where the parties are unable to reach
agreement on the adjustments to be made to the base power rate or the tolling charge, the matter
is to be referred to an independent expert whose opinion is conclusive and binding. Revised
Master Agreement, supra note 122, art. 49.
134. Casely-Hayford & Sims, supra note 25, at 43.
135. This assumes an 80% production capacity and a metal price of 73 cents per pound. Id.
136. Indeed, since the implementation of the revised agreement, the country has made sub-
stantial economic gains from the project. In 1987 the company paid $25 million in taxes, the
highest since it began production in 1967. The figure, which was slightly higher than two-thirds
of the taxes paid by the company up to 1984, was obtained in spite of reduced operations at the
smelter. Payments to the VRA in 1986 were also the highest in the company's history, standing
at $18 million. Valco, Report and Financial Statements for the Year Ended December 1987, at 4
(1987) (unpublished report).
137. Casely-Hayford & Sims, supra note 25, at 36.
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rates paid by other customers of the VRA. 38 Furthermore, the com-
pany was able to preserve some of the concessions of the original
agreement despite the obvious criticisms that had been leveled against
them. For example, the benefits derived from the retention of the
duty-free status of imported alumina 39 and exported aluminum in-
gots"4° more than compensated for the relatively minor duties now
placed on items such as private vehicles and furniture. In addition,
the easing of Ghana's foreign exchange restrictions on Valco now
makes it possible for Valco to declare dividends without interference
from the Government.1 41 Valco scored a definite victory by securing a
right of preemption to excess energy produced by the government.
The enforceability of the new power allocation formula under condi-
tions of force majeure means that the company is always guaranteed a
minimum of energy for its operations.
Admittedly, making the whole contract subject to Ghana's legisla-
tive power is much less assuring to Valco than the stabilization clause
of the original agreement - where the contract was governed by such
laws of Ghana as existed in 1962. However, by conceding to applica-
tion of international law as part of the law of Ghana, the new provi-
sions directly confer the same protection upon Valco without the need
for express contractual assurances. Eliminating otherwise redundant
and irritating clauses affecting the country's proud status as a sover-
eign by redrafting the provision on guarantees of international invest-
ment has removed a major source of academic opposition from
Ghana's legal community. By far, the greatest gain to the company is
the more durable agreement it has obtained.142 The alternatives to a
negotiated settlement, whether nationalization or a legislated solution,
would have severely interfered with the company's operations. Pro-
tracted litigation was also avoided and now the company can look for-
ward to more peaceful operations.
While the revised agreement provided gains for both parties, it
nevertheless failed to address some issues that were the subject of con-
cern in the early 1980s. For instance, the only solution to the environ-
mental control problem was a general undertaking by Valco during
the renegotiations to "develop and implement a programme of studies
138. Togo, Benin, and the Ivory Coast could conceivably pay 40-50 mills/kwh for the elec-
tricity they receive from the VRA.
139. Revised Master Agreement, supra note 122, art. 20(B).
140. Id. art. 19(A).
141. This is, however, subject to the company having enough funds in Ghana to meet its
local obligations. Id. art. 33.
142. Casely-Hayford & Sims, supra note 25, at 44.
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and work for the control of environmental hazards resulting from the
operation of the smelter ... in consultation with the Environmental
Protection Council and in accordance with the laws of Ghana."' 143
Although this concession by Valco was extremely mild, it was not in-
corporated in the final document. A more effective strategy would
have been to provide for an independent assessment of the environ-
mental costs of the company's operations, compensation of environ-
mental claims, and the institution of environmental controls similar to
those undertaken by aluminum companies in the United States.
With respect to Ghana's representation on the board of directors
of Valco, both sides had agreed to an amendment of Valco's articles of
incorporation to require the appointment of two directors to the board
by the Ghanaian government. 144 At the beginning of the renegotia-
tions, Valco had eight directors, six of them appointed by Kaiser, and
the remaining two by Reynolds. Yet, because the parties did not reach
any firm agreement on the numerical limit of board members,
Ghanaian representation could be but a token presence should Valco
decide to substantially increase the size of its board.
Interestingly, the Government rejected an invitation by Valco to
acquire up to twenty percent of the equity of Valco at current book
value, although indicating its readiness to enter into discussions at a
future time over the terms of such an acquisition. 45 Although the
reasons for the Government's rejection are not clear, accepting the of-
fer would have brought some benefits to the country. Government
acquisition of shares in Valco would not only mean greater revenues
from dividends, but also would be an incentive to begin processing the
country's bauxite because, as an equity owner, Ghana would be re-
sponsible for supplying a proportionate percentage of the alumina
used by the plant. Equity ownership would also ensure that the coun-
try received a firm portion of the aluminum produced at the smelter;
accordingly, the Government's position is worth reconsidering in fu-
ture negotiations.
143. Renegotiation of the Valco Agreements Between the Government of Ghana and Volta
Aluminum Company, Ltd., Heads of Agreement, para. 12 (summary) (July 10, 1984) [hereinaf-
ter Heads of Agreement].
144. Id. para. 9. Given that Valco already had representation on the VRA Board, it was
hard for Valco to reject the Government's request that it have reciprocal representation on the
Valco board.
145. Interview with Akilagpa Sawyerr, supra note 34.
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IV. FACTORS AFFECTING THE OUTCOME OF THE
RENEGOTIATIONS
The year Valco was invited to renegotiate the Master Agreement
was a particularly disappointing one for Kaiser, Valco's ninety percent
shareholder. To Kaiser officials, 1982 meant "[h]ard times for the
company ... the worst economic downturn since the Great Depres-
sion... [and] the toughest business year" they could remember. 146 In
contrast with the steady profits it had made in the 1970s, Kaiser exper-
ienced a record loss of $115 million in 1982147 as a result of "lower
aluminum volume, higher costs and inadequate prices" caused by a
general economic slump.148
To stave off the decline, Kaiser reduced its aluminum operating
capacity in order to lower its inventory and other carrying costs. 149
As a result, its average annual worldwide production of primary alu-
minum fell from 1.03 million to 617,000 tons. 150 While a number of
its plants worldwide shut down as part of the new corporate strat-
egy, 5 1 the Valco plant was allowed to operate normally, 5 2 producing
more than 174,000 tons of primary aluminum per annum.1 53 At that
level of production, the Ghanaian plant, then aptly described as a de-
pendable source of aluminum, 54 increased its contributions from sev-
enteen percent of Kaiser's global production to about thirty percent,
thereby making it an extremely useful component of Kaiser's interna-
tional operations.
Valco was invaluable because it had lower energy costs than other
smelters worldwide. In 1982, while smelters in Japan, Taiwan,
France, and the United States paid an average of forty-five mills/kwh,
Valco paid less than ten mills/kwh for its power.' 55 Therefore, it was
not surprising that leading industrial journals considered Valco to be
146. KAISER ALUMINUM & CHEMICAL CORP., 1982 ANNUAL REPORT 2 (1982) [hereinafter
1982 KAISER REPORT].
147. Id.
148. Id. at 6.
149. They also reduced their salaried work force by about 25%, and reduced the annual
common stock dividend from $1.40 a share to $0.60 a share. Id. at 2.
150. Id. at 35; KAISER ALUMINUM & CHEMICAL CORP., 1988 ANNUAL REPORT 42 [herein-
after 1988 KAISER REPORT].
151. In the United States, Kaiser closed down the Chalmette and Ravenswood smelters.
152. It was only in 1983 that drought conditions on the Volta Lake forced the closure of a
number of the Valco potlines.
153. VOLTA ALUMINUM COMPANY, LIMITED (VALCO), 1982 ANNUAL REPORT 5 (1983).
154. Id.
155. ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, ALUMINUM IN-
DUSTRY ENERGY ASPECTS OF STRUCTURAL CHANGE 33-40 (1983).
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"the cheapest source of primary metal in Kaiser's supply system. 1 56
In the context of international competitiveness, Valco was important
to Kaiser because Kaiser had become increasingly overburdened by
reliance on short duration power contracts for its U.S. plants. For
example, in 1982 the Bonneville Power Administration announced a
fifty-two percent increase in the power rates it charged Kaiser's Mead
and Tacoma smelters, a revision that would cost the company 52 mil-
lion dollars more annually. 57 This sharp increase in energy costs
forced the company to reduce its smelting operations and to stop ex-
pansion plans in the domestic plants affected.' 5 8 Since the Valco
smelter was its cheapest facility, Kaiser was anxious to maintain it as
an integral part of its international operations.
Valco's labor supply was also significant. Although Valco employ-
ees were well paid by Ghanaian standards, their wages paled in com-
parison to those of their counterparts in the United States.1 59 They
were also more docile. But for the politically motivated worker dem-
onstrations early in 1982, Valco had enjoyed a fairly stable relation-
ship with its employees. This was in sharp contrast to the unpleasant
labor troubles Kaiser had experienced in the United States' 6° -
problems that eventually forced the closure of Kaiser's Ravenswood
smelter in 1982.
Given Valco's importance in terms of stable aluminum supplies
and low smelting and labor costs,' 6 1 the Valco shareholders saw the
wisdom in acting reasonably to prevent a shift in public sympathy and
to prevent any unilateral action from the Ghanaian government.' 62
They came to the conclusion that renegotiation was the only way to
156. METALS WK., Feb. 4, 1985, at 1.
157. 1982 KAISER REPORT, supra note 146, at 8. According to Cornell Maier, Chairperson
of Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp., the rates had been increased 800% over their 1981
rates, impacting the company by at least $160 million a year by 1985. See S.F. Bus. J., Apr. 22,
1985, at 3.
158. 1982 KAISER REPORT, supra note 146, at 8.
159. Currently, the average daily wage for eight hours work in Ghana is 300 cedis (about
U.S. $1.00) while it is $34.00 in the United States.
160. For example, it had difficulties negotiating a new labor agreement with workers at the
Chalmette plant. Talks broke down over Kaiser's request to remove its employees from the
umbrella of the aluminum industry's master contract previously negotiated with the general
union. See METALS WK., Oct. 24, 1983, at 3.
161. This was still true even in 1988. Thus, following the acceptance in 1988 of the MAX-
XAM Inc. Group's buyout offer by Kaiser Technology, Ltd., the parent company of Kaiser
Aluminum & Chemical Corp., William Shedonberg, an analyst at Smith Barney, indicated that
although he thought MAXXAM would probably sell off some of Kaiser Technology's other
foreign operations, he believed they would probably not consider selling the "operation in the
West African nation of Ghana because it [was] a relatively cheap source of ingot." L.A. TIMES,
May 24, 1988, Business Part 4, at I.
162. Casely-Hayford & Sims, supra note 25, at 36.
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save their profitable investment. 163 It would not only bring stability to
their operations in Ghana, but could even lead to better terms for the
company. Although concern for the financial stability of the VRA
was a factor in the agreement to renegotiate, 164 Valco was motivated
by more immediate self-interests. During the renegotiations, the com-
pany tried to focus discussions on the profitability of its operations.165
Various economic, political, and social forces strengthened the
country's bargaining position. Perceived injustices in the terms of the
Master Agreement under the harsh economic conditions of the early
1980s had galvanized a large cross section of the public against the
company. 166 For instance, Valco could not justify either the low
power rate or the monopoly that Valco had over energy supply during
a period of dwindling national foreign exchange reserves and insuffi-
cient electricity supplies for critical sectors of the Ghanaian econ-
omy.16 7 The unrelenting public protests against the company
obviously bolstered the confidence of the Ghanaian negotiators as did
the keen interest exhibited by the World Bank and the international
business community 168 in the negotiations.
The posture Ghana adopted was equally invaluable; the Govern-
ment's resoluteness convinced Valco to take the renegotiations more
seriously than it had taken previous efforts to review the contract in
the 1970s. Throughout the discussions, it reaffirmed its full support of
the team 69 which in turn dutifully kept the Government abreast of
developments through regular written and verbal reports prepared by
a ministerial subcommittee set up to oversee the negotiations. 170
By far, the most important factor that influenced the outcome of
the negotiations was the markedly improved negotiating skills of the
Ghanaian team. Composed of experts in areas pertinent to the
Ghana-Valco arrangements,' 71 it proved to be an equal match for the
163. Graham, supra note 49, at 105-06.
164. Interview with Ward Saunders, at headquarters of Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical
Corp., in Oakland, California (Jan. 17, 1989).
165. See Casely-Hayford & Sims, supra note 25, at 35.
166. Workers Demonstrate Against Valco Cuts, W. AFR., June 28, 1982, at 1726.
167. Graham, supra note 49, at 98, 99.
168. A mining industry journal assessed that Ghana had a "strong case" during the renegoti-
ations. See METAL BULL., Jan. 7, 1983, at 19, quoted in Casely-Hayford & Sims, supra note 25,
at 33.
169. Graham, supra note 49, at 106.
170. The negotiating team reported almost daily to the Secretary for Lands and Mineral
Resources. Between rounds it also provided written accounts to the ministerial subcommittee
comprising the Secretaries for (a) Lands and Mineral Resources, (b) Finance and Economic
Planning, and (c) Fuel and Power.
171. It included Professor Akilagpa Sawyerr (Vice-Chancellor of the University of Ghana) as
leader, Louis Casely-Hayford (Chief-Executive of the VRA), E.A.K. Kalitsi (legal advisor of the
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smaller, yet sophisticated, Valco team. 172 In preparation for the rene-
gotiation, members of the Ghanaian team worked hard to improve
their knowledge of the strengths, weaknesses, and goals of aluminum
companies. 173 They also spent a great deal of time analyzing the inter-
national costs of production and marketing strategies in the industry
to make up for the advantage the Valco representatives enjoyed due to
daily exposure to the industry. The information gathered by the
Amissah Committee in the eight months preceding the renegotiations
helped the government team develop sufficient expertise on the indus-
try for arms' length negotiations. 174 Use of a number of foreign ex-
perts by the negotiating team was a very wise move, for given their
extensive knowledge on the art of negotiating with multinational com-
panies, the experts were able to guide the Ghanaian team to clarify its
objectives and to develop coherent strategies in negotiations.
The Ghanaian team had a strong sense of discipline that made it
possible to maintain a great deal of formality. But for rare interven-
tions agreed on beforehand, only the leader of the Ghanaian team
spoke during the early rounds. However, when the negotiating teams
broke into working groups to discuss technical issues in subsequent
rounds, there was more open discussion, subject to approval at plenary
sessions presided over by the team leaders. 175 At the conclusion of
every negotiating day, the Ghanaian team held separate review ses-
sions of the day's proceedings in order to coordinate strategies for the
next negotiating sessions. 176 As a rule, a member of the team was as-
VRA), and Fui Tsikata (a law professor known for his critical views on the operations of TNCs).
Other members were A. Addae, Karen Akuwumi, I. Odoi, Y. Sanni Lamptey, Audrey Quaye,
Lauretta Lamptey, and Stephen Nortey. Mike Faber and Rod Sims, experts from the Technical
Assistance Group of the Commonwealth Fund for Technical Cooperation, and Roland Brown
from the U.N. Centre on Transnational Corporations, provided technical support to the team.
The Ghanaian team also benefitted from the advice of leading international economists such as
Makbul Rahim and Raj Kumar from the Commonwealth Secretariat, an Argentine named Car-
los Varsavsky, and Carlton Davis, Executive Director of the Jamaican Bauxite Institute.
172. Reynolds, as a passive partner, left the actual negotiations to the Kaiser management,
which sent the following representatives: Ward Saunders (Managing Director), John Miller
(Deputy Managing Director), E.A.K. Akuoko (Substitute Director), J.V.L. Philips (Deputy Res-
ident Manager), Wall Scott (an accountant), Gordon Rogers (international tax counsel), John
Buckman (an industrial engineer), Hall Coulter (Plant Manager), and Christopher Sam (an In-
dian national working as the company's financial analyst). The names were provided by John
Miller, Managing Director of Valco, during an interview in Oakland, California, on January 17,
1989 [hereinafter Interview with John Miller].
173. Id.
174. Although the government accepted the Amissah Committee's recommendation in June
1982 to renegotiate the Ghana-Valco arrangement, it refrained from issuing the letter of invita-
tion until December of that year, after the nucleus of the negotiating team had been formed and
an agenda prepared for the negotiations. Tsikata, supra note 41, at 7.
175. Ansah, supra note 35, at 8.
176. Id. at 6-8.
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signed the task of observing the negotiations closely and in particular
of noting important hints from the company's side that suggested sig-
nificant shifts in position. For each meeting, the guiding principles for
the discussions were set out clearly by the Government team and thor-
oughly rehearsed. The team frequently made written proposals and
demanded written responses in the belief that written answers were
likely to be more accurate than verbal ones. 177
From the outset of the negotiations, in a clear effort to discourage
any attempts by Valco to undercut the team and negotiate more
favorable terms from other political organs in the country, the
Ghanaian team made it clear that the negotiating team was a cohesive
unit that enjoyed full governmental support. Nevertheless, the com-
pany tested the unity of the team. For instance, following the collapse
of talks after the third round, the company tried to negotiate directly
with the Government. However, the Government rebuffed the com-
pany and used the occasion to reaffirm its full confidence in the
Ghanaian negotiating team.1 78 As a rule, members of the Ghanaian
team refused to disclose their personal views about the contract talks,
repeating only the official positions taken by the Government.
It is to the credit of the negotiators that they came to an early
decision on formulating agreements at their meetings. Two conflicting
positions had been presented. The first called for drafting the appro-
priate legal formulation as soon as each agreement was reached, while
the second required a broader agreement on policy matters that would
be put into precise legal language later by draftsmen. The eventual
compromise was to conclude a general agreement, referred to as the
Heads of Agreement, to which would be appended the technical agree-
ments formulated during the negotiations.1 79
Things went well until the negotiating team conceded the drafting
of the final agreement to the Valco lawyers, who naturally resolved
any ambiguities in favor of the Valco shareholders.18 0 This incident
illustrates the role lawyers can play in negotiations due to their differ-
ent cultural backgrounds.' 8 ' Much to the dismay of the Ghanaian ne-
gotiating team, the U.S. lawyers, trained in an adversarial system,
were not inclined to protect the interests of all parties in the negotia-
tions. The Ghanaian lawyers had naturally assumed their own egalita-
177. Tsikata, supra note 41, at 8-11.
178. Interview with Fui Tsikata, supra note 34.
179. Sawyerr, supra note 54, at 71-72.
180. Id. at 73.
181. D.N. SMITH & L.T. WELLS, NEGOTIATING THIRD WORLD MINERAL AGREEMENTS:
PROMISES AS PROLOGUE 155 (1975).
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rian inclinations when they conceded the right to draft the final
language to the U.S. lawyers.1 82 Fortunately, these problems were
quickly removed at the next round of negotiations.
This tactical error by members of the Ghanaian team at the con-
clusion of the renegotiations should not blur their impressive negotiat-
ing record. The Ghanaian team's knowledge about the aluminum
industry caught the Valco team by surprise. The company, therefore,
lost no time in calling for an adjournment in the first round 83 so
Valco could revise its strategies in order to deal with a group whose
skills and experience it could no longer underrate. The Ghanaian
team understood Valco's negotiating strategies and effectively de-
fended against them. Thus, the Ghanaian team not only was able to
expose falsified data Valco presented in support of Valco's position,18 4
but also it was able to demonstrate the fallacies in a number of Valco's
arguments. 185 Holding the talks at the VRA headquarters186 strength-
ened the Ghanaian team psychologically; as the host, it could more
readily influence the agenda.
A tactic effectively employed by the team was its skillful use of the
media. The ground rules for the renegotiations barred contact with
the press except through occasional joint statements released by both
parties. Still, the Ghanaian team believed that its cause was justiciable
and that a total blackout on its general demands and postures would
have severely restricted its bargaining power. At convenient times,
therefore, it unilaterally contacted the press to publicize its position in
an attempt to gain public sympathy. 187 Contact with the media was
182. Sawyerr, supra note 54, at 73-74.
183. Talks with Valco Resume, supra note 102, at 971.
184. Tsikata, supra note 41, at 9-10.
185. For instance, the Ghanaian side painstakingly explained how the exchange rate in
Ghana did not affect Valco's operations in the manner alleged, and also showed that the price of
aluminum metal had never risen as high as the company contended.
186. Except for the formal opening ceremony and a drafting session in London, all the meet-
ings were held at the VRA boardroom. A drafting session took place in the London office of
Kaiser's lawyers because the Commonwealth Secretariat, where the meeting would otherwise
have been held, could not be opened on a Saturday to accommodate the tight schedule of the
drafting team. Interview with Fui Tsikata, supra note 34.
187. Ghanaian overtures to the media took place even before the start of the renegotiations.
For example, three members of the Amissah committee who had gone to London in early De-
cember 1982 to consult with the Technical Assistance Group of the Commonwealth Secretariat
arranged a meeting with representatives from leading industry journals such as the Mining Jour-
nal and Financial Times. At the meeting, participants were shown a fact sheet describing Valco
and some of the problems that had arisen with its operations in Ghana. The tactic worked well
because the participants came away feeling that Ghana's call for a review of the 1962 Agreement
was fully justified. As Ghana had quite rightly calculated, the journalists filled their respective
newspaper columns with accounts of the VRP project and called Ghana's request for renegotia-
tions reasonable. The timing was perfect because the newspaper reports were released just three
weeks prior to the start of the renegotiations. See, e.g., MINING J., Jan. 14, 1983.
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supplemented by the Government's constant contact with the diplo-
matic community to apprise them of developments at the
renegotiations. 188
V. COMPARISONS WITH THE PROCESS IN THE
ORIGINAL NEGOTIATIONS
There has been a remarkable change in the bargaining powers of
Valco and the Ghanaian government since the original contract. In
1962, Kaiser and Reynolds came out with very generous terms' 89 be-
cause of the upper hand they had in what were essentially negotiations
involving unequal parties.190 Although it is tempting to see this ine-
quality in terms of the sizes of the companies vis-a'-vis the country,191 a
far more plausible explanation for the Government's relatively weak
bargaining methods is its relative lack of information about the indus-
try. 192 As two of the "Big Six," the affectionate name of the six largest
aluminum companies of the world, 193 Kaiser and Reynolds effectively
controlled the information about prices, costs, reserves, alternative ex-
pansion paths, and production conditions, thereby enabling them to
make better forecasts of business trends, which helped them to form
their demands during the negotiations. The Government, on the other
hand, generally did not have the same incentive as the aluminum com-
panies to acquire detailed knowledge of the aluminum industry.
While it is the everyday function of the companies to acquire informa-
tion about the industry in order to survive, the Government's interest
was limited to obtaining tax revenue, and very little effort was made to
amass technical information about the industry. 194
As is typical in many host country-TNC negotiations, 195 the bar-
188. After the breakdown of talks at the end of the third round, the Secretary for Finance
and Economic Planning met with representatives of some African countries to clarify the nature
of the Government's negotiations with Valco and accused the company of negotiating in bad
faith.
189. Walter A. Chudson, Multinational Enterprises in Developing Countries. Some Issues in
the Manufacturing Section, in MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND GOVERNMENTS supra
note 98, at 129, 130.
190. George W. Ball, The Relations of the Multinational Corporation to the "Host" State, in
GLOBAL COMPANIES: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF WORLD BUSINESS 64, 65 (George W. Ball
ed., 1975).
191. Hymer, The Efficiency of Multinational Companies, in THE MULTINATIONALS AND
THE NATION STATE 49, 60 (G. Paquet ed., 1972).
192. See Faber & Brown, supra note 66, at 113-14.
193. The rest are Alcoa, Alcan, Pechiney Ugine Kuhlman, and Alsuisse.
194. See Norman Girvan, Making the Rules of the Game: Company Agreements in the Baux-
ite Industry, 20 Soc. & ECON. STUD. 378, 383 (1971).
195. SANJAYA LALL & PAUL STREETEN, FOREIGN INVESTMENT, TRANSNATIONALS AND
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 27 (1977).
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gaining power of Kaiser and Reynolds was strengthened by indirect
support from the U.S. government and from a number of its agencies.
Consistent with its policy of using aid as a form of subtle support for
the corporate system, 196 the U.S. government approved the use of Ex-
imbank loans for the VRP on the condition that U.S. aluminum com-
panies be partners in the VRP.1 97 Even the United States Agency for
International Development (USAID) took the unusual step of agree-
ing to Kaiser's request to guarantee fully the Valco investment 9 be-
cause the U.S. administration viewed the VRP as crucial to the
attainment of its political 99 and economic 20° objectives in Africa.
This tacit support of aluminum companies by the the U.S. government
was a big boost to Valco and provided the company with a measure of
credibility in its negotiations with the Ghanaian government.
A major weakness in the Government's position during the origi-
nal negotiations stemmed from the overwhelming passion of Nkrumah
for the project. Even before serious negotiations began with the alumi-
num companies, Nkrumah had already committed himself to the pro-
ject - not only by his statements, but also by the infrastructure
196. Private foreign investment has traditionally been important to the U.S. government as
an effective complement to its aid program, as a way of procuring strategic raw materials for the
United States, and as a means of assuring U.S. access to the global market. Herbert Salzman,
How to Reduce and Manage the Political Risks of Investment in Less Developed Countries, in
GLOBAL COMPANIES: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF WORLD BUSINESS, supra note 190, at 85,
92-93.
197. JAMES MOXON, VOLTA: MAN'S GREATEST LAKE 202-03 (1969).
198. Before the company could obtain international financing for the smelter, it was required
to secure a broad U.S. guarantee protecting it from the effects not only of nationalization of the
smelter, but also of taxation and labor troubles. Despite criticisms that the guarantee was a
business favor at taxpayers' expense and would confer undue market advantage to Kaiser at the
expense of its competitors, the Kennedy administration agreed to meet Kaiser's request. See
RICHARD MAHONEY, JFK: ORDEAL IN AFRICA 164-70 (1983).
199. President Kennedy, who had become quite alarmed that Nkrumah might make good on
a threat to invite the Russians to participate in the project, saw U.S. support of the scheme as the
most effective way of curbing the spread of Russian influence in Africa, and in particular, of
preventing the Russians from taking control of Ghana's bauxite and hydroelectric power and
sealing off the West's access to such strategic resources. See MAHONEY, id., at 164; RONALD
GRAHAM, THE ALUMINUM INDUSTRY AND THE THIRD WORLD 183-84 (1982). U.S. participa-
tion would also constitute sweet revenge following the U.S. government's failed policy in the
Aswan Dam where at the last minute it withdrew its funding of the project and left the Russians
to complete it. See HART, supra note 9, at 44-45. In addition, the U.S. government hoped that
its support would encourage Ghana to remain nonaligned and also enhance U.S. African policy.
See generally AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES: PAPERS IN THE HISTORY, POLITICS AND ECONOMICS
OF AFRICA (Christopher Allen & R.W. Johnson eds., 1970).
200. The economic benefits to the United States of encouraging international investments
such as the VRP were stated by Eugene Black, former World Bank President, to include substan-
tial and immediate market opportunities for U.S. goods and services, the development of new
overseas markets for U.S. companies, and the orientation of national economies towards a free
enterprise system in which U.S. firms would prosper. HARRY MAGDOFF, THE AGE OF IMPERI-
ALISM 176 (1969).
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construction he began in order to support the proposed project. 20 1 To
the companies it appeared that Nkrumah needed them more than they
needed the VRP.20 2 Without agreement on the part of the companies
to utilize part of the hydroelectricity to be produced, no international
loans would have been available to finance the project.20 3 The compa-
nies were, therefore, able to publicly conceal the critical nature of their
own demand for electricity, making it appear that they were but reluc-
tant partners who needed to be wooed by the most generous of terms.
Because the country was determined to get the project going, Ghana
was not inclined to use bluffs and delays as bargaining strategies.204
During the renegotiations, however, no such consuming desire for the
operation of the VRP was evident. Ghanaians had grown dis-
enchanted after almost twenty years of operations during which the
promised bonanza of foreign exchange had not materialized. They
were, thus, less concerned about discontinuing the project. This time
it was the companies that were more anxious to get the project going
in order to reduce the losses they were experiencing in a declining
world aluminum industry.
The dominance of the ruling party in Parliament in the 1960s ad-
versely affected the original negotiations. It effectively stifled any op-
position that could have provided the Government negotiating team
with cause to reconsider the largess of its concessions. No public de-
bates were ever held about the proposed project; consequently, the
Government did not have the opportunity to gauge the strength of
public reactions to the scheme. 205 On rather infrequent occasions the
President had appeared before Parliament to provide bare sketches of
progress in the talks. The comments that followed the President's in-
frequent presentations not only showed how gullible the House was,
but also showed how grossly misinformed it was about the objectives
of the scheme. 2°6
201. These included roads, houses, water supplies, markets, and electric power. MOXON,
supra note 197, at 100-01.
202. For example, in a letter to Nkrumah in 1960 Edger Kaiser wrote about his initial reluc-
tance to participate in the aluminum venture, and about how he continued with the project only
because Nkrumah wanted the project pressed forward. Id. at 106.
203. See HART, supra note 9.
204. Ghana's only serious threat was its intention to approach the East if the West was not
forthcoming in financing for the project. The threat worked because the U.S. State Department
was determined to avoid another Aswan fiasco.
205. The former Managing Director disputes this, claiming that "the arrangements [were
not] secretly arrived at with only a few aware of the terms." According to this official, "[t]he
entire Master Agreement and related documents were widely publicized in Ghana and submitted
to and approved by the national Assembly on two occasions." Saunders, supra note 73, at 195.
206. Take, for instance, the following strong praise of the project's potential by a government
member:
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Even internal obligations undertaken by the Government in con-
nection with the project received little attention in Parliament. For
instance, the bill creating the VRA, the hub of the entire project, was
debated under a certificate of urgency such that all stages for voting on
the bill took no more than an hour.20 7 In contrast to the open and
extended public debates on the VPR before and during the renegotia-
tions, the legislature, at this earlier stage, had little opportunity to ana-
lyze the bill. 2 °8
During the original negotiations the Government team was neither
as well-informed nor as organized as the team that renegotiated the
Ghana-Valco agreement. The original team was made up of senior
government officials with limited background knowledge of the alumi-
num industry.2°9 Coordinating the original negotiations could have
posed some difficulty given the existence of several political units, each
with some influence over the negotiations. Thus, while a cabinet min-
ister led the country's delegation in the original negotiations, matters
of policy were decided by a cabinet committee under the chairship of
the President. Complicating this further was a special secretariat
which was set up to assist the negotiations and to conduct the routine
work of bringing the project forward.21 0
The Government team of the 1960s also suffered from destabilizing
changes in its membership. The Finance Minister, Gbedemah, who
had conducted the negotiations on behalf of the Government since
The implementation of this project envisaged by [President Osagyefo] will bring relief to all
of us. Both men and women in all walks of life will be required to give their services to the
huge project. It will be a feather in Ghana's cap as an independent country to have such a
gigantic project. With this hydroelectric power in our country, many factories will be estab-
lished, and we shall be in a position to manufacture most of our commodities. The project
will help solve many problems such as unemployment, for men and women will get enough
work to do.
21 PARL. DEB., (1st ser.) 162 (1960-61).
This view was patently false as the plans for the project had deemphasized its labor aspects.
Besides, the limited power supply provided to the private manufacturing sector certainly could
not hold the kind of promise envisaged by this government official. Furthermore, contrary to
popular expectations, irrigation was not a main objective of the project; there were no plans to
extend irrigation more than a few miles from the dam. HART, supra note 9, at 28.
207. At that time, a bill had to go through both the first and second consideration stages as
well as a third reading before it became law.
208. Provisions of the bill were kept secret from House Members until five minutes before the
debate. HART, supra note 9, at 29.
209. Under the leadership of K.A. Gbedemah (Finance Minister), and E. Ayeh-Kumi
(Chairman of the Development Secretariat), the team consisted of cabinet ministers and senior
civil servants. It received advice from S. Ratnam, whose services were made available by the
Government of India; Weisfelt, a member of the U.N. staff in Guinea; and W. Molyneux, of
Cooper Brothers and Company, Chartered Accountants. See REPUBLIC OF GHANA: THE
VOLTA RIVER PROJECT-STATEMENT BY THE REPUBLIC OF GHANA 11 (1961).
210. Id.
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1956,211 lost his position as a negotiator and fled the country in 1961
at the most critical stage of the discussions. 212 His absence was no
doubt a big loss to the Government, given his experience, his familiar-
ity with the negotiations, and the respect he had developed by working
with the aluminum companies and with international financial institu-
tions.213 Gbedemah's involvement in the original negotiations demon-
strates the problem with placing the full responsibility of negotiating a
complex foreign investment on the shoulders of a Government minis-
ter already saddled with other national commitments. Such a minister
simply does not have the time to grasp the detailed aspects of the pro-
ject and is unable to effectively participate in the negotiating sessions.
It is to the credit of Gbedemah that he ably handled the negotiations
with Kaiser, the World Bank, and the U.S. State Department. 214
However, a better strategy would have been to appoint a team of ex-
perts to handle the original discussions, as occurred during the
renegotiations.
Cohesiveness appeared to have eluded the Government team dur-
ing the original negotiations. Gbedemah held views different from
Nkrumah regarding the best strategy to secure U.S. support of the
scheme. He did not agree with Nkrumah's tactic of announcing an
alliance with the Soviets to force the hand of the United States if U.S.
help was not forthcoming. 21 5 At one stage Gbedemah even suggested
to a U.S. State Department official that the official request the White
House to "express with great directness and force" its concern about
Ghana's communist ties.216 This was one indication that Gbedemah
was conniving with the U.S. government to make a retraction of
Nkrumah's pro-Soviet propaganda a condition of U.S. participation in
the project. Before long, Gbedemah was involved in a conspiracy, ac-
tively supported by the U.S. State Department, to overthrow
Nkrumah. The discovery of his treason forced him into exile in
1961 .217 Given the coziness that characterized Gbedemah's relation-
ship with his counterparts at the bargaining table,218 it is conceivable
211. Id.
212. DENNIS AUSTIN, POLITICS IN GHANA 406-07 (1964).
213. According to George Woods, an advisor to Kaiser on the financing of the VRP, it was
Gbedemah, more than anyone else, who sold him on the VRP project. MOXON, supra note 197,
at 70 n.1.
214. He worked hard to get the negotiations moving when the State Department stalled the
talks on account of Nkrumah's pro-Soviet pronouncements. Id. at 104-05.
215. See MAHONEY, supra note 198, at 166-67.
216. Id. at 167.
217. Id. at 172-74.
218. MoxoN, supra note 197, at 104-05.
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that some of Ghana's demands may have been compromised. It is
suspicious that the World Bank quickly offered Gbedemah a high pro-
file position soon after he went into exile.219 In sharp contrast, the
head of the Government's renegotiating team, Professor Sawyerr, held
the same ideological views as the PNDC government. According to
company officials, Professor Sawyerr came across as a firm negotia-
tor,220 eager to obtain better terms for Ghana. He allowed very little
room for cozy politics.
Although the Government took advice from foreign experts during
the original negotiations, several of these experts had close links to
Valco, which called the objectivity of their advice into question. In the
peculiar arrangement of the VRP, Kaiser advised the Government on
developments in the industry. This role - combined with a close per-
sonal relationship between Edgar Kaiser, the President of Kaiser, and
Nkrumah - left open the possibility that self-serving advice from
Kaiser may have been uncritically accepted. For example, Kaiser rec-
ommended that the Ghanaian government employ Cooper Brothers,
an accounting firm used by the Kaiser Corporation, to create analysis
supporting Ghana's application for a World Bank loan. Kaiser then
arranged for George Woods of First Boston Bank to advise Ghana
both on how to evaluate Cooper Brothers' work and on how to pre-
pare the actual application for financing the Volta scheme. 221 The ob-
jectivity of Woods as an aide to the Ghanaian government becomes
more suspect when one considers his background as director of Kaiser
Steel (part of the Kaiser Corporation) from 1952 to 1963, President of
the World Bank from 1965 to 1968, and Chair of the Kaiser Family
Foundation after 1968!222
With these maneuvers, Kaiser was able to effectively dominate two
conflicting sides in the VRP negotiations, acting first on its own behalf
in its negotiations with the Ghanaian government on a power rate, and
then as an advisor to the Government in its discussions with the
World Bank. These discussions turned out to involve an evaluation of
the power rate agreed upon by Kaiser and the Government. Because
of these questionable ties, it appears that none of these foreign advisors
could have been relied on to provide the same critical perspective of
the aluminum industry as was provided by the international consul-
tants during the renegotiations.
From this comparative discussion, it is clear that several of the
219. He refused the job offer.
220. Interview with John Miller, supra note 172.
221. GRAHAM, supra note 199, at 178.
222. HART, supra note 9, at 50.
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mistakes made in the original negotiations were not repeated in the
renegotiation of the Ghana-Valco Agreement. A dramatic improve-
ment in the country's methods of dealing with Valco resulted. To a
very large extent, this accounted for the successful outcome of the
1983-85 renegotiations.
CONCLUSIONS
The arguments - both those supporting and those rejecting the
right to renegotiate 223 - are difficult to apply to investment con-
tracts224 involving more complex considerations 225 than the relatively
simple market exchange of commodities which the rules of contract
have traditionally regulated. 226 TNCs, as exemplified by Valco in the
period preceding the Ghana-Valco renegotiations, have resisted at-
tempts to renegotiate transnational investment agreements, fearing
that such attempts would destroy a much needed stability in their
business operations. 227 Host countries, on the other hand, convinced
that investment schemes operate in a fluid economic environment,
223. See supra notes 62-74 and accompanying text. See generally Geiger, supra note 62.
224. Hartley W. Shawcross, The Problems of Foreign Investment in International Law, 102
R.C.A.D.I. 339, 343 (1961).
225. To begin with, the doctrine of equality in bargaining that is assumed to be the basis of
contracts, and thus the justification for precluding any reviews, was not present in many of the
early investment contracts. TNCs, armed with sufficient information of the industry and backed
by a host of national and international agencies, entered the original negotiations with a superior
hand. They were able to take advantage of the ignorance or diplomatic weakness of their bar-
gaining partners. With help from their network of supporting agencies, the TNCs pressured the
host country into granting them generous terms. During the colonial era, it was normal policy of
the colonial government to give home companies extremely generous concessions, probably as a
way of keeping imperial control of the economy. See, e.g., the concessions made to the British
Aluminium Company by the colonial government, in GRAHAM, supra note 199, at 128. Such
contracts could not, therefore, be said to have been entered into freely by the people of the
colonial territory.
Furthermore, trying to justify the right to modify investment contracts under the theory of
sovereignty is hardly appropriate to investment contracts, which by their very nature require
cooperation and stability and rarely contemplate premature termination. Indeed, for any mutual
benefits to be derived at all, such contracts must go the distance.
226. See generally P.S. Atiyah, Contracts, Promises and the Law of Obligations, 94 LAW Q.
REV. 193 (1978).
227. TNCs desire stability in their operations because the investments generally require large
capital outlays, especially in the extractive industries where vast sums of money may be needed
for survey and exploration as much as ten years before production actually begins. For an accu-
rate analysis of expected returns, or to satisfy the conditions for loans from banks, the companies
often require the host government to spell out the entire range of fiscal impositions for the whole
life of the agreement. Thus, stabilization clauses are included in the arrangement as a matter of
sound investment because any alterations of the financial package could substantially reduce the
company's financial returns and disrupt the financing arrangements, which are often based on the
assumption that the business will continue to yield a high return sufficient to enable prompt
repayment of the loans. From this perspective, companies have been particularly reluctant to
accede to requests for renegotiations, as the renegotiations inevitably lead to changes in contrac-
tual arrangements. See Faber & Brown, supra note 66, at 111-13.
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have viewed with suspicion any stabilization arrangements that denied
them the right to modify investment agreements. 228 It would appear,
therefore, that the main sources of tension in the relations between the
two parties has been first, the failure to address satisfactorily the con-
cerns of the host country, and second, the attempt to fit the investment
within the rigid framework of an ordinary contract with no possibility
for review.
Because terms of agreements become progressively outdated as
economic conditions change, no reasonable investor can expect to
freeze the legislative and fiscal environment of the investment agree-
ment. As a compromise, it is necessary for both parties to the invest-
ment agreement to see it as a flexible arrangement and to try genuinely
to accommodate adjustments in order to ensure fairness to each
other.229 Although this method involves accepting the principle of re-
negotiations, the legitimate concern of the TNCs for stability should
be respected by qualifying the right to modify the agreement in some
fashion. Thus, it may be useful to spell out clearly the conditions that
would trigger renegotiations, 230 either by reference to a fixed term
(e.g., five years), or after a material change of fundamental circum-
stances (such as excessive profits, world market price change, or
change in home country legislation). The scope of such renegotiations
could also cover either the whole operation or be limited to key provi-
sions such as the fiscal regime, pricing, or employment. 23
Agreeing to review the investment arrangements in good faith pro-
vides an effective means of guaranteeing the stability of the invest-
228. The problem host countries have with these arrangements is not so much that they have
to make fiscal guarantees as the fact that they are compelled to make elaborate and immutable
guarantees based on incomplete information. Id. at 113-14. A government typically is forced to
calculate the elements of the financial requirements over a long period, at a time when it does not
have enough knowledge of the potential of the economic resource in question. Owing to its weak
bargaining power and its anxiety to get the project started, the country frequently enters into
long term agreements before even conducting the necessary feasibility study of the resource -
arrangements that disproportionately benefit the TNC. With time, however, as the government's
information about the resource improves and where the investment turns out to be more profita-
ble for the company than originally envisioned, the government feels cheated and calls for rene-
gotiation.
In the event of a windfall to private investors, the government would feel that whoever nego-
tiated the deal sold the country's heritage too cheaply, and would endeavor, consistent with its
responsibilities to present and future generations, to review the contract. When the tide ,hanges,
as it must, the government will attempt to rectify the situation. Id. at 115.
229. Thomas W. Walde, Revision of Transnational Investment Agreements in the Natural
Resource Industries: Contractual Flexibility in Natural Resource Development, 10 LAW. AM.
227, 265 (1977).
230. Id. at 262-68.
231. Roland Brown, The Relationship Between the State and the Multinational Corporation
in the Exploitation of Resources, 33 INT'L & COMp. L.Q. 218, 224 (1984).
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ment; it dissuades the host country from taking unilateral action. 232
The description of a concession agreement as an "agreement to make
concessions" 233 is clearly humorous, but it reflects an understanding of
the dynamism inherent in the investment contract that makes it neces-
sary for the parties involved to maintain a continuing give-and-take
relationship. Renegotiations constitute the only mechanism by which
the frustrations of all parties234 can be checked in the long term inter-
ests of the whole contract.
The case study of the VRP illustrates the changing power relation-
ships between a transnational company and a host country over the
life of an investment project 235 as their relative contributions to the
project change. At the beginning of the contract, Valco's contribu-
tions were greatest due to its capital, managerial know-how, sophisti-
cation in the aluminum industry, and ties to the U.S. State
Department. Ghana's bargaining position was originally very weak
because it lacked expertise in the aluminum industry and also because
its desperation to get the project started was well known. Thus, it was
easy for Valco to wring favorable concessions from the Government.
Over time, having gained sophistication about the industry, the Gov-
ernment found that Ghana's share of the revenues no longer matched
its contribution to the project, and that Valco's contributions to the
national economy had declined relative to the rewards it was taking
out of the country. As the production facilities (such as the smelter)
could not easily be removed, the country now held the investment cap-
tive, making the threat of expropriation a constant negotiating
strength.
A generalization from this study is that there is a good chance a
host country will request review of an investment project when the
country is going through serious economic problems that are believed
to be aggravated by exceptionally generous terms granted to a TNC in
an investment arrangement. 236 The PNDC government inherited a
232. See generally Louis T. Wells, Negotiating With Third World Governments, HARV. Bus.
REV., Jan.-Feb. 1977, at 72.
233. The comment is attributed to the foreign partners in the LAMCO project in Liberia,
cited in Asante, supra note 69, at 413.
234. The argument for renegotiation has been stated as if it benefits only the host country.
The reverse is also true, as the experience of the Shashe copper project in Botswana reveals. In
that case, renegotiation was requested by the participating TNC because changing conditions
rendered its obligations under the agreement unduly onerous. Brown, supra note 57, at 629;
Asante, supra note 69, at 414 n.16.
235. SMITH & WELLS, supra note 181, at 1-25.
236. THAKOOR PERSAUD, CONFLICTS BETWEEN MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND
LEss DEVELOPED COUNTRIES: THE CASE OF BAUXITE MINING IN THE CARRIBEAN WITH
SPECIAL REFERENCE TO GUYANA 77-78 (1980).
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grave economy riddled by severe balance of payments problems, de-
clining foreign exchange reserves, and a huge national debt. The VRP
was perceived as contributing to this state .because the low power rate
paid by the smelter decreased potential government revenue. Commit-
ted as it was to undertaking a rigorous economic recovery program,
the Government decided that revamping the largest foreign invest-
ment scheme in the country would be the most logical step to redress
the situation.
The inherent tension frequently seen in a host country's view of
foreign investors may be expressed in the period leading up to the re-
negotiations. Although the host country may want the benefits
brought by TNCs, it often sees the companies as instruments of eco-
nomic and even political domination. In Ghana such views played a
role in the decision to review the VRP contract. The incident involv-
ing the three expelled Valco employees confirmed the Ghanaian gov-
ernment's distrust of TNCs as instruments of subversion. In
approaching renegotiations, both sides should be aware of the exist-
ence of suspicions such as these. Tension may be decreased if the com-
pany's representatives includes experienced people knowledgeable
about the culture and attitudes of the developing country and compe-
tent to formulate an effective strategy to allay any unfounded mistrust.
This approach narrows any cultural differences and improves a mutual
understanding of each other's goals.
By requesting renegotiations, the host government should realize
that it runs the risk of a conflict, and hence should make only those
demands that would appear to be morally and economically defensi-
ble. In Ghana, freezing the power rate that Valco had been charged
for thirty years, despite the steep increases in world energy costs, was a
provision that the government knew even the most partial observer
would find unfair. In the renegotiations the Government team was
concerned mainly with showing how this and other provisions in the
original agreement had fallen out of step with prevailing practice in
the international aluminum industry. This was a far more reasonable
negotiating strategy than demanding to take control of the investment.
The nonthreatening nature of the country's position found wide appeal
from the international business community, whose support proved to
be a significant factor in the outcome of the renegotiations. 237
A TNCs receptivity to renegotiation is affected by its own analysis
of attendant risks as well as the importance of the investment to the
company. Dealing with a civilian government where changes in gov-
237. See supra notes 168 and 187 and accompanying text.
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ernmental policies were usually adopted after lengthy parliamentary
debates and numerous ministerial meetings (with frequent opportuni-
ties for lobbying by company officials) was less risky for Valco than
dealing with a military government like the PNDC. In the civilian
situation, Valco could use the democratic process to resist renegoti-
ation; Valco used this strategy successfully during the civilian adminis-
trations preceding the PNDC. The PNDC's administrative style -
where government policy is usually made by a few top government
officials - allowed very little opportunity for Valco lobbyists. Fur-
thermore, a strong government like the PNDC could have followed
through with threats to take unilateral action while suffering few ad-
verse domestic political consequences. In such a risky situation, Valco
was forced to reevaluate the importance of its investment and to re-
spond favorably; otherwise, by adopting a confrontational attitude it
stood to lose its very promising and inexpensive international
operation.
The renegotiation process is more successful when both parties rec-
ognize it as a give-and-take session rather than a zero sum game. In
Ghana, the net result was an increase in potential revenues, but along
with that benefit came an assumption of some production risks previ-
ously borne by the company. This result could not have been reached
simply by requesting renegotiations. Of far more importance was the
Government team's preparation for renegotiations. Based on the
Ghanaian team's success, it seems beneficial for host countries to de-
velop local expertise regarding the international industry within which
the TNC is operating. It undercuts the advantage the TNC previously
enjoyed and makes it easier to expose any false statistics presented by
the TNC during the discussions. Foreign experts can also provide use-
ful information on behavioral tendencies and tactics of TNCs within
the industry.
By maintaining a unified front, a government team can make a
coherent presentation of issues, thereby increasing its effectiveness.
Specific strategies would, of course, depend on the circumstances of
each negotiation. The use of delay, bluffs, threats, and written submis-
sions were effective in the Ghana-Valco encounters. Thus, any devel-
oping country contemplating renegotiations is well advised to plan
carefully because its negotiating strategy could make or break its case.
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